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I. INTRODUCTION: AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
The asserted unimportance of the defendant's motive underlying
acts giving rise to tort liability is part of the conventional wisdom of
most writers of basic tort texts.' Frequently, the irrelevance of the de-
fendant's motivation is considered so obvious that many writers fail to
discuss it at all, or discuss it only in the limited context of punitive
damages. Virtually all of the literature that considers the significance of
motive in tort law deals with either altruism, primarily in the rescue
context, or spite, primarily in the punitive damages context. However,
little, if any, of the literature considers the legal treatment of defend-
ants who act for economic gain. In fact, the premise underlying the vast
majority of the so-called "law and economics" literature either assumes
a social acceptance of acting for economic gain or affirmatively argues
that acting for economic gain is a fundamental social value. The pur-
pose of this Article is not to enter the "is wealth maximization a value"
debate.2 Rather, this Article attempts to demonstrate that, although
some commentators claim that the pursuit of economic gain is lauda-
tory, statutory and common-law development reveals a deep-seated so-
cial bias against those whose conduct is motivated by a desire for
1. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, TORTS 497 (1st ed. 1888) (stating that "[m]alicious motives make a
bad case worse, but they cannot make that wrong which is in its essence lawful"). This remains the
English and Australian view. See W. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWIcZ ON TORT 48-49 (12th ed.
1984) [hereinafter WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ]; F. TRINDADE & P. CANE, THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRA-
LIA 12 (1985).
2. See infra notes 193-94.
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economic gain. In some cases, acting for economic gain is treated more
harshly and with greater suspicion than conduct motivated by spite.'
This Article reconsiders the conventional wisdom and argues that
the actor's motivation is frequently a significant, though unarticulated,
factor in the formulation of much tort doctrine. This Article attempts
also to demonstrate that when courts develop principles of liability and
damages that are truly independent of any consideration of the actor's
motive, whether real or perceived, legislatures tend to reject those moti-
vation-neutral principles in favor of liability and damages rules based
on the defendant's economic motivation.
Before attempting to discuss any of the cases and legal doctrines in
which the actor's motivation plays a role, it is useful to categorize the
several types of motivation that a particular actor may have. It is as-
sumed that every actor acts with at least some hope of personal benefit.
This anticipated benefit may be either economic, noneconomic, or
mixed. Additionally, every action is primarily self-focused or second-
party focused.
An actor is economically motivated when he acts to attain immedi-
ate, tangible economic gain; future, possible tangible economic gain; or
a climate that may facilitate future tangible economic gain by creating
goodwill. An economically motivated act is always self-focused even
though second parties will necessarily be affected by it.
Noneconomic motivation can be either self-focused or second-party
focused. Altruism and spite, for example, are types of noneconomic, sec-
ond-party focused motivation. In the case of altruistic behavior, one
confers a noneconomic benefit on oneself by conferring a benefit,
whether economic or noneconomic, on another.4 In the case of spite, one
confers a noneconomic benefit on oneself by performing an act consid-
ered detrimental to a second party. Frequently, of course, the motive
that underlies such conduct is purely, or at least primarily, self-focused,
but still noneconomic. Noneconomic, second-party focused conduct may
prove to be to another's detriment or benefit, but the motivating factor
is simply to confer a benefit on oneself, regardless of how it affects
other parties. Thus, for example, a speeding driver may be acting either
for his own enjoyment or because getting some place sooner will benefit
3. Consider, for example, the commonly held attitudes toward a paid killer, on the one hand,
and the individual who kills another because of personal animosity, on the other. The conduct of
the professional actor normally would be considered more deplorable. While there are clearly many
possible explanations for this judgment, at least part of the attitude involves an instinctive sense
that immoral conduct for money is the least defensible form of human behavior.
4. This definition is similar, though not identical, to that commonly used by the economists.
Professor Posner, for example, defined an "altruist" as "one who derives utility from the utility of
another." See R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 188 (2d ed. 1972).
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him in a pecuniary manner or otherwise. In either case, his motivation
would be considered self-focused because any benefit or detriment con-
ferred on a second party is merely incidental to the actor's reason for
engaging in the activity.
Under circumstances in which the conduct is best classified as
noneconomic self-focused, motive is truly irrelevant from a legal stand-
point. The relevant legal inquiry is whether the actor knew or should
have known the consequences of his act to himself or to others. For this
Article's purposes, the cases involving truly noneconomic, self-focused
conduct are the least important.5 They become important only in cases
in which self-focused conduct is considered to be sufficiently antisocial
so as to be treated as the legal equivalent of spite or malice.6
Economic and noneconomic motivation, one should note, are not
mutually exclusive categories. Consider, for example, conduct that is in-
tended to reduce or eliminate risk to others, or otherwise provide some
benefit to others, such as the act of a physician in providing treatment.
On one hand, the physician's act clearly will result in economic gain to
him. On the other hand, a benefit to the patient is intended.
Interestingly, the law tends to treat certain types of mixed-motive
activity differently than other examples of mixed-motive conduct. A
physician's profit seeking activity, for example, tends to be treated as
altruistic rather than profit oriented-noneconomic rather than eco-
nomic. As a result, a physician's particular act done in conjunction with
providing products and services is judged almost invariably under a
negligence standard rather than under a strict liability standard. Fur-
thermore, as this Article will illustrate, there is both a judicial and leg-
islative tendency to relax liability and damages rules so as to favor
physicians.7
The exact opposite can be observed in the liability imposed on
pharmaceutical companies. The drug manufacturer, like the doctor, is
providing a benefit to an intended class of patients and, at the same
time, acting for economic gain. Yet in the case of the drug manufac-
turer, the liability rules resemble strict liability, while in the case of the
physician the lower negligence standard may even fail to establish lia-
bility. The disparate treatment of the two must necessarily be ex-
5. This is not to say, of course, that noneconomic, self-focused conduct is unimportant in the
greater scheme of things. The inadvertent, negligent conduct underlying most automobile acci-
dents, for example, generally would be classified as noneconomic self-focused. Obviously, this type
of case makes up a large percentage of the total number of tort cases.
6. The test formulated by the courts under these circumstances is generally "conscious disre-
gard for the safety of others." Such a malice equivalent is found commonly in the course of justify-
ing the imposition of punitive damages. See generally Note, Punitive Damages in California
Under the Malice Standard: Defining Conscious Disregard, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 1065 (1984).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77 and infra note 115 and accompanying text.
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plained in terms of the public perception of the activity. In the case of
the doctor, the risk creating conduct is perceived as altruistic, while in
the case of the drug maker, risk creating conduct is perceived as profit-
seeking.'
The disapproval of those who are perceived to be acting with a
profit motive is manifested in several important types of legal rules. A
perception of altruism may explain outright exemption from liability
through an express doctrinal grant of immunity, although this is com-
paratively rare. More commonly, legal doctrine will provide that indi-
viduals acting for their own economic benefit may be expressly held to a
higher standard of care, although examples of these doctrinal distinc-
tions, like outright immunity, are somewhat rare and becoming rarer.
Finally, most recently, and arguably most significantly, individuals act-
ing for their own economic benefit may be exposed to an increased
range of damage remedies, most notably exposure to punitive damages,9
while those perceived to be acting altruistically are sometimes granted
arbitrary limitations on the potential amount of damages.1 °
II. MANIFESTATIONS OF THE "SUSPECT" NATURE OF CONDUCT
MOTIVATED BY ECONOMIC GAIN
A. The "No Liability" Rules
1. Express Grants of Immunity-The Charitable Immunity Doctrine
The clearest, but by no means the only, manifestation of the desire
to exculpate the altruist is the now discarded doctrine of charitable im-
munity. For approximately 100 years, "charitable organizations" were
considered to be immune from tort liability." Various explanations
8. The pharmaceutical manufacturer has been selected to illustrate this phenomenon be-
cause its conduct is similar to that of the physician. However, it should be observed that almost
any product manufacturer is providing a benefit to a class of persons for its own economic gain.
9. A case also may be made that jurors apply legal standards differently depending on
whether they perceive the conduct to be primarily altruistic or primarily profit seeking. However,
due to a lack of empirical evidence, the jury's application of legal rules (as distinguished from the
legal rules themselves) will not be considered here. But see Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive
Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1982). Professor
Owen notes that "jurors have a natural sympathy for a seriously injured person that is reinforced
when the defendant is a manufacturer, for many persons are hostile toward major institutions in
general and 'big business' in particular. Some jurors may thus be tempted to resort to simplistic
explanations of the issue (such as that the defendant callously 'traded lives for dollars') that com-
port with their preconceived notions of manufacturers' oppression of consumers." Id. at 11 (foot-
notes omitted); see also H. KALVE & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
10. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
11. The charitable immunity doctrine is traced to the English decision in Heriot's Hosp. v.
Ross, 12 C. & F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846). Although the doctrine was repudiated in England in
Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H.L. Cas. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866), American courts began to
1988]
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have been offered for this phenomenon, some more plausible than
others. Some historians have explained the doctrine as a product of the
pro-business attitudes of the nineteenth century. These historians draw
a parallel between the creation of some tort rules, which protected rail-
roads and other industries, and the doctrine of charitable immunity,
which protected organizations that were perceived to have consciously
eschewed a profit motive.12
Rather than attempting to draw such a parallel, however, it would
seem far more plausible to recognize that there are two distinct and
contradictory trends in American tort law. One trend is an overt ten-
dency to protect economic achievement and the institutions formed for
the realization of that economic achievement. 13 This tendency is evi-
denced not only by such highly criticized "pro-business" rules as the
fellow servant doctrine, contributory negligence, and voluntary assump-
tion of risk," but also by the rationalism inherent in the "wealth max-
imization as a value" principle underlying the law and economics
movement. 5 The other trend is a tendency, largely emotional, to pro-
tect altruistic acts specifically because of the absence of a profit motive.
The independence of this second trend is illustrated by the three dis-
tinct forms that the charitable immunity doctrine assumed.
a. Blanket Immunity of Charitable Enterprises
The most extreme application of the charitable immunity doctrine
protected the charity regardless of whether the injured plaintiff was a
beneficiary of the charitable activity or a stranger, and regardless of
whether the defendant's liability was alleged to have arisen from its
own primary fault in the selection of employees or its vicarious fault for
adopt it. See, e.g., Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885); McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen.
Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
12. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 416 (1973). Professor Friedman
treats all corporate entities alike. Thus, he asserts:
There is a suspicious parallel between these [early charitable immunity] cases and early cases
on the fellow-servant rule. In both instances, the court seemed concerned with distribution of
costs. In both cases, they seemed fearful that liability would damage the defendant too badly.
Plaintiffs-perhaps some lower courts too-looked on corporations, including charities, as a
cat looks on a canary. The appellate courts of the 19th Century felt constrained to fight the
impulse.
Id.
13. Id.; see also Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967).
14. The obvious addition to this list would bg the privity doctrine. However, as this Article
argues, the privity doctrine is better understood in terms of a combination of the traditional expla-
nation of business protection and the economic gain explanation under discussion here. See infra
text accompanying notes 56-69.
15. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
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the acts of those employees.'6 For example, in Gregory v. Salem Gen-
eral Hospital'7 the plaintiff was injured when a nurse incorrectly ap-
plied a hot water bottle. The complaint alleged not only negligent
conduct by the nurse, but also negligent conduct by the hospital be-
cause it knew that the nurse was incompetent. It was also claimed that
the hospital was negligent in failing to provide a call signal that would
have enabled the plaintiff to summon for help. In the course of af-
firming the trial court's decision granting defendant's motion for a di-
rected verdict, the court observed that "[u]niversally there is a
reluctance to render anyone liable for an injury to another which he has
inflicted while engaged in unselfishly helping others."'
The charitable immunity enterprise was immune from liability
based on its primary negligence as well as vicarious liability for the con-
duct of its agents, servants, and employees. 9 Although such immunity
generally was limited to liability arising from tortious conduct, there
was substantial authority that extended that immunity to liability for
breach of contract when the facts alleged also would have supported a
tort action.20
16. For cases stating the rule broadly, see Arkansas Valley Coop. Rural Elec. Co. v. Elkins,
200 Ark. 883, 141 S.W.2d 538 (1940); Parks v. Northwestern Univ., 218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 991 (1905);
Davin v. Kansas Medical Missionary & Benevolent Ass'n, 103 Kan. 48, 172 P. 1002 (1918); Univer-
sity of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219 (1907); Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear
Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 A. 898 (1910); McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432
(1876); Dille v. St. Luke's Hosp., 355 Mo. 436, 196 S.W.2d 615 (1946); Gregory v. Salem Gen.
Hosp., 175 Or. 464, 153 P.2d 837 (1944); Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League, 353 Pa. 408, 45 A.2d
59 (1946); Lindler v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914); Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis.
334, 6 N.W.2d 212 (1942).
17. 175 Or. 464, 153 P.2d 837 (1944).
18. Id. at 482, 153 P.2d at 844. Interestingly, the court also referred to the closely related
situation of "guest passenger immunity," noting "[t]hat reluctance has prompted our legislature to
render a driver immune from liability to a non-paying guest unless his fault was extraordinary."
Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 117-28.
19. Bodenheimer v. Confederate Memorial Ass'n, 68 F.2d 507 (4th Cir.) (applying Virginia
law), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 629 (1934); Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 59 Idaho
350, 82 P.2d 849 (1938); Old Folks' & Orphan Children's Home v. Roberts, 83 Ind. App. 546, 149
N.E. 188 (1925); Emery v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921); Roosen v. Peter
Bent Brigham Hosp., 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392 (1920); Vermillion v. Woman's College, 104 S.C.
197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916); Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N.W.2d 212 (1942).
20. See, e.g., Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Durney v. St.
Francis Hosp., 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753 (1951); Davin v. Kansas Medical Missionary & Benevolent
Ass'n, 103 Kan. 48, 172 P. 1002 (1918); Pikeville Methodist Hosp. v. Donahoo, 221 Ky. 538, 299
S.W. 159 (1927); Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392 (1920); Greatrex
v. Evangelical Deaconess Hosp., 261 Mich. 327, 246 N.W. 137 (1933); Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v.
Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930); Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 92
Neb. 162, 137 N.W. 1120 (1912); Fields v. Mountainside Hosp., 22 N.J. Misc. 72, 35 A.2d 701
(Essex County Cir. Ct. 1944); Lovich v. Salvation Army, 81 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 459 (1947);
Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 A. 1087 (1910); and other cases collected at Annota-
tion, Immunity of Nongovernmental Charity from Liability for Damages in Tort, 25 A.L.R.2d 29,
48-50 (1952).
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b. Partial Immunity of Charitable Enterprises: Liability to Paying
Patients
Mark Twain once wrote: "If you pick up a starving dog and make
him prosperous, he will not bite you. This is the principal difference
between a dog and a man."'" Common wisdom thus coupled the prefer-
ential treatment accorded the altruist with a distaste for the ingrate.
However, to the extent that the charitable immunity doctrine relied on
a community sense of the inappropriateness of permitting recipients of
charity to bite the feeding hand, the blanket immunity seemed to go
too far: the charitable enterprise immunity doctrine barred the claims
of those who paid as well as those who did not.
To avoid this "injustice," a number of courts carved out an excep-
tion to the charitable immunity doctrine that allowed a paying patient,
who therefore was "not a recipient of the charity,"22 to recover from an
organization notwithstanding its charitable activities. Similarly, some
jurisdictions distinguished between "beneficiaries" and "strangers," and
allowed only the latter to recover from a charitable institution.23
"Strangers" included those who received no direct benefit from the
charity, such as a patient's visitors,24 private nurses,25 and those who
transported others to charitable hospitals.2" As the charitable immunity
doctrine fell into disfavor, however, the courts became increasingly crit-
ical of the stranger-beneficiary distinction.27
In applying this second, limited form of charitable immunity, the
21. M. TWAIN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON 142 (Harper & Bros. American Artists ed. 1922).
22. Williams v. Union County Hosp. Ass'n, 234 N.C. 536, 67 S.E.2d 662 (1951); see also
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v.
Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951); Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hosp., 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E.
199 (1924). There is also the closely related problem that charging for services may negate the
"charitable" status of the defendant. Generally, however, it will not. See, e.g., Boardman v. Burlin-
game, 123 Conn. 646, 197 A. 761 (1938).
23. See, e.g., Simmons v. Wiley Methodist Episcopal Church, 112 N.J.L. 129, 133, 170 A. 237,
239 (1934) (finding that a denial of liability to a user of a public highway for the negligent opera-
tion of a motor vehicle would be "repugnant to one's sense of justice").
24. See, e.g., Alabama Baptist Hosp. Bd. v. Carter, 226 Ala. 109, 145 So. 443 (1932); Lusk v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 199 So. 666 (La. Ct. App. 1941); Walker v. Memorial Hosp.,
187 Va. 5, 45 S.E.2d 898 (1948).
25. See, e.g., President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
1942); Rose v. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp., 13 N.J.L. 553, 57 A.2d 29 (1948);
Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius, 37 Ohio App. 171, 174 N.E. 256 (1930), aff'd, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173
N.E. 737 (1931).
26. See, e.g., Kolb v. Monmouth Memorial Hosp., 116 N.J.L. 118, 182 A. 822 (1936). It is
interesting to note that in Kolb the plaintiff was a volunteer fireman. The court was careful to
point out that he received no compensation for his services, and thus the case can be explained as
a resolution of the conflicting equities between two altruists.
27. See President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 819-22 (D.C.
Cir. 1942).
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courts focused on the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant
rather than the charitable or noncharitable nature of the defendant's
enterprise. In these jurisdictions, the immunity was not available if the
defendant's relationship with the particular plaintiff was not altruistic,
even though, as a general proposition, the enterprise still might be char-
acterized as altruistic. Nevertheless, this class of cases was based on the
same underlying rationale as the blanket immunity cases, notwithstand-
ing the limitations imposed in an attempt to refine the doctrine.
c. Partial Immunity of Charitable Enterprises: No Vicarious
Liability
The third form of charitable immunity protected the enterprise
only from the strict liability that resulted from application of respon-
deat superior principles. In cases in which the liability was alleged to
have arisen from the primary fault or negligence of the the enter-
prise-negligent selection of employees, for example-the immunity
was not available."8 Given the nature of the tendency to exculpate the
altruist, it is not surprising to find that tendency most pronounced
when the liability of the altruist is based on a nonfault theory. The
reason for this is fairly obvious. Even if one accepts the premise that
the altruist is worthy of protection, his actual culpability or fault in
causing the particular harm may justify holding him liable. When, how-
ever, there is no blameworthy conduct by the altruist, but rather liabil-
ity is imposed for some other reason, it might seem unfair to impose
that liability.
Perhaps for this reason, some jurisdictions developed a distinction
between a charitable organization's "corporate negligence," for which
there was liability, and a subordinate employee's negligence, for which
the charity was not liable.29 This distinction was carried to its logical,
though extreme, conclusion in Jurjevich v. Hotel Dieu0 in which the
court held that a charitable hospital was not liable for the hospital su-
perintendent's negligence. The court reasoned that because the hospital
was a corporate entity, it must necessarily act through its agents and
employees. Therefore, there is no difference between the acts of an em-
28. White v. Providence Hosp., 80 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1943); Haliburton v. General Hosp.
Soc'y, 133 Conn. 61, 48 A.2d 261 (1946); Hamburger v. Cornell Univ., 240 N.Y. 328, 148 N.E. 539
(1925); Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N.C. 594, 83 S.E. 807 (1914); Love v. Nashville Agric. & Normal Inst.,
146 Tenn. 550, 243 S.W. 304 (1921); Hotel Dieu v. Armendarez, 210 S.W. 518 (Tex. Civ. App.
1919); Canney v. Sisters of Charity, 15 Wash. 2d 325, 130 P.2d 899 (1942).
29. See, e.g., White v. Providence Hosp., 80 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1943). In these cases the
subordinate employee might well be liable individually. This fact, of course, ignores the reality that
generally the individual would be unable to pay any judgment assessed against him.
30. 11 So. 2d 632 (La. Ct. App. 1943).
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ployee who has management responsibilities and the acts of subordinate
employees 31
The preliminary question of who is an agent or servant for pur-
poses of the imposition of vicarious liability was itself deeply influenced
by the existence or nonexistence of a pecuniary benefit flowing to the
party to be held strictly liable for the tortious conduct of another. Al-
though most writers and jurists today generally agree that the decision
to impose liability on one person for the conduct of another is based on
instrumentalist considerations of efficient loss allocation, internalization
of costs and other economic considerations, 2 the prevailing view during
the latter part of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth
century justified that liability allocation on the basis that the tortious
act was performed for the benefit of another. Thus, it was appropriate
for the party receiving that benefit to bear the loss.
33
Even after the benefit theory of vicarious liability generally had
fallen out of favor, some courts continued to apply the theory to chari-
ties. Thus, for example, one line of decisions refused expressly to apply
the rules of respondeat superior because the principal was not seeking
to derive economic gain from its conduct. 4
Regardless of the variety of the charitable immunity doctrine ap-
plied, the different jurisdictions were not uniform in their enunciation
of the underlying rationale. While some courts openly acknowledged the
basis for the doctrine, others intentionally or unintentionally obscured
it, by relying most often on a theory that it would be beyond the powers
of a trust to use funds designated for a charitable purpose to satisfy
judgments resulting from tort actions.35
31. Id. at 635. The court did not decide expressly whether the corporate entity could be held
liable for the acts of its officers and directors. See also Comment, Charitable Institutions: Liabil-
ity for Tortious Conduct, 17 TUL. L. REV. 621 (1943) (discussing and criticizing the Jurjevich
decision).
32. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOEES, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 500-01 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
33. See, e.g., Century Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Northern Ireland Rd. Transp. Bd., [1942] 1 All E.R.
491, 497 (Wright, L.J.) (noting that "[t]he act of a workman in lighting his pipe or cigarette is an
act done for his own comfort and convenience and at least, generally speaking, not for his em-
ployer's benefit. That last condition, however, is no longer essential to fix liability on the
employer").
34. It is important to understand that the criticism of these cases on the ground that "the
vicarious liability of a master is certainly not limited to profitable businesses" misses the point. W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 993 (4th ed. 1971). The distinction underlying this line
of cases is not whether the business actually made a profit, but rather whether the business was
perceived to be acting for economic gain or not. See generally Evans v. Lawrence & Memorial
Assoc. Hosp., Inc., 133 Conn. 311, 50 A.2d 443 (1946); Emery v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400,
236 S.W. 577 (1921); Thornton v. Franklin Square House, 200 Mass. 465, 86 N.E. 909 (1909);
Bachman v. YWCA, 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922); see also cases cited supra note 28.
35. For cases relying on a trust fund theory, see Arkansas Valley Coop. Rural Elec. Co. v.
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d. Judicial Repudiation of the Charitable Immunity Doctrine
The charitable immunity doctrine was never favored by commenta-
tors, notwithstanding the early widespread judicial support for the
rule.3 6 By the early 1950s, it was clear that the "trend [was] . . . away
from immunity and toward liability. '37 The history of the doctrine in
New York is illustrative of the national pattern. In 1914 the New York
Court of Appeals decided Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospi-
tal.36 Although ultimately the case was not decided on the basis of char-
itable immunity, Judge Benjamin Cardozo approved of the doctrine on
the theory that a recipient of charity impliedly waived any action
against the hospital for the tortious conduct of its employees.3 9 In 1957
the New York Court of Appeals overruled Schloendorff, rejecting the
doctrine of charitable immunity.40 Since then, virtually all jurisdictions
have rejected the doctrine, at least in its original form.41
2. Immunity from Liability Through "No Duty" Rules
a. Acts and Omissions
The old notion that there may be tort liability for "acts" but not
for "omissions" is expressed in the theory of "nonfeasance immunity. '42
Like the charitable immunity cases, the nonfeasance immunity cases
Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S.W.2d 538 (1940); Parks v. Northwestern Univ., 218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 991
(1905); Emery v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921); Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear
Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 A. 898 (1910); Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885); McDonald v.
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876); Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hosp., 137 Mo. App. 116,
117 S.W. 1189 (1908); Jones v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533, 82 A.2d 187 (1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 886 (1951); Gregory v. Salem Gen. Hosp., 175 Or. 464, 153 P.2d 837 (1944);
Bond v. City of Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328 (1951).
36. See, e.g., Note, Torts-Scope of Liability of Charitable Hospitals in New York, 25
N.Y.U. L. REV. 612 (1950); Note, Charitable Institutions-Liability for Torts of Their Agents, 22
VA. L. REV. 58 (1935); Recent Decision, Charities-Hospitals-Liability to Paying Patients for
Negligence of Employees, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1485 (1938); Recent Decision, Negli-
gence-Charities-Immunity from Tort Liability, 49 MICH. L. REv. 148 (1950); Recent Case, Illi-
nois Tort Liability of Charitable Corporations, 16 U. CH. L. REV. 173 (1948); Recent Case,
Torts-Charities-Liability of Charitable Corporation for Negligence of Servant, 91 U. PA. L.
REv. 571 (1943); Comment, Tort Responsibility of Charitable Corporations, 34 YALE L.J. 316
(1924).
37. Annotation, supra note 20, at 142.
38. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
39. Id. at 128-29, 105 N.E. at 93. For a discussion of the "waiver" or "consent" theory, see
infra text accompanying notes 176-79.
40. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
41. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895E (1979) unequivocally denies the existence of
any immunity resulting from the charitable status of the enterprise. This Article argues, however,
that the doctrine of charitable immunity has been partially resurrected under the guise of the
"Good Samaritan" legislation and medical malpractice reform acts. See infra text accompanying
notes 89-94.
42. J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF ToRTs 139 (6th ed. 1983).
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can be explained by the economic motivation of the actor. Professor
John Fleming offered the explanation that "[t]he heart of the nonfea-
sance rule consists in the peremptory refusal to attach legal sanctions to
gratuitous undertakings to confer a benefit on the promisee, as there is
no more sacrosanct axiom in our jurisprudence than that a promise
without consideration will not be enforced. ' 4 The so-called "rescue
cases" demonstrate this rationale for nonfeasance immunity.
The most common illustration of the rescue doctrine points out
that a passer-by owes no duty to come to a drowning man's aid," but a
lifeguard hired to perform such a service clearly does.45 The imposition
of a tort duty in the latter case cannot be explained in terms of a con-
tractual duty owed to the drowning man, although one might argue that
there should be such a duty under a third party beneficiary theory.
Rather, such rules must be explained in terms of the imposition of a
legal burden on the individual motivated by a desire for economic gain.
Moreover, legal rules have evolved that specifically reward and protect
the altruistic rescuer. For example, if the rescuer is injured in the res-
cue attempt, he falls within the scope of the duty owed by a negligent
third party to the endangered person, even though the rescuer would
not be considered a "foreseeable plaintiff" under an ordinary duty
analysis. 6
The "nonfeasance immunity" rules enjoy widespread, but not uni-
versal, support.47 Perhaps as a result, the common law created a num-
ber of exceptions to the nonliability rules. For example, although an
innocent passer-by may have no obligation to rescue, the rescuer has a
43. Id. It is interesting to note the rather close connection between the "economic gain" ele-
ments of the consideration requirement for the imposition of contractual liability and the eco-
nomic gain requirement sometimes essential to the imposition of tort liability. Both would seem to
be indicative of the same underlying community sense as to when the imposition of liability is
appropriate. The problem can be observed again in connection with the early privity requirement
for the finding of a duty. See also WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 1, at 80-81 (asserting that the
nonfeasance immunity rule is "not surprising in view of the fact that long before the development
of the tort of negligence our law had attached the label 'contract' to duties to act for the benefit of
others and, moreover, had insisted that a contractual duty could arise only on the basis of a prom-
ise, express or implied, supported by consideration or seal").
44. Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928); Horsley v. MacLaren, 2 O.R. 487,
499 (1970) (Jessup, J.).
45. J. FLEMING, supra note 42, at 139.
46. Wagner v. International R.R., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 437-38 (1921) (stating
that "[d]anger invites rescue.. . . The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer.
He is accountable as if he had"); see also J. FLEMING, supra note 42, at 156 (observing that "in its
anxiety to support the rescuer, modern law has generally evinced little interest in the conventional
requirements of 'foreseeability' and 'duty' "). At least under certain circumstances, the rescuer also
may be immune from liability if he is negligent in the course of the rescue. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 70-94 (regarding the "Good Samaritan" legislation).
47. See generally Zeisel, An International Experiment on the Effects of a Good Samaritan
Law, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 209 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
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duty to exercise reasonable care once he commences his rescue
attempt.4 8
Furthermore, exceptions to the "no duty of affirmative action" doc-
trine have been created when the defendant created the dangerous situ-
ation, even if he did so nonnegligently,49 or when there was a specific
type of pre-existing relationship between the parties. Several of the
types of relationships that serve as the basis for making an exception to
the no-duty rule are linked directly to the economic motive of the de-
fendant. Courts have recognized a duty of affirmative action owed by an
occupier of land to a business invitee, 50 an innkeeper to a guest,51 and a
common carrier to its passengers.5 2 In each of these instances, the legal
duty imposed arises from the actual or anticipated economic gain to be
derived by the defendant.53 Professor Fowler Harper explained:
affirmative duties are imposed only in situations where the one under a duty to act
has voluntarily brought himself into a certain relationship with another from which
he obtains or expects benefit. There is in a sense a "consideration" moving to the
person under the affirmative duty, although that "consideration" need not move
from the one asserting the right correlative to the duty.5 '
Nonfeasance immunity thus remains an important legal rule, despite its
judicial modification. 5 The most significant judicial modification in-
volves a limitation of the immunity when the defendant's economic gain
is a factor.
48. See J. FLEMING, supra note 42, at 138. The existence of such a duty is not as clear in the
United Kingdom as it is in the United States. See generally WINFIELD & JOLOWIcZ, supra note 1,
at 83.
49. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Thorin, 120 Neb. 684, 234 N.W. 628 (1931); CAL. VEH. CODE § 20003
(West Supp. 1987) (requiring all drivers who are involved in motor vehicle accidents to stop and
render "reasonable assistance").
50. See Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, Inc., 28 Cal. 2d 394, 170 P.2d 5 (1946); L.S.
Ayers & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942); Dickey v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 157
Md. 448, 146 A. 282 (1929).
51. See West v. Spratling, 204 Ala. 478, 86 So. 32 (1920).
52. See Layne v. Chicago & A.R.R. Co., 175 Mo. App. 34, 157 S.W. 850 (1913).
53. See Linden, Rescuers and Good Samaritans, 34 MOD. L. REv. 241, 242-43 (1971).
54. F. HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 197 (1933). It would appear that Professor
Harper has overstated this proposition somewhat because the duty of affirmative action also has
been imposed in cases involving parents and children, see State v. Staples, 126 Minn. 396, 148
N.W. 283 (1914), and land occupiers and social guests, see Tubbs v. Argus, 140 Ind. App. 695, 225
N.E.2d 841 (1967), neither of which can be explained by reference to a benefit rationale. For a
further discussion of "social guests," however, see Seavey, I Am Not My Guest's Keeper, 13 VAND.
L. REv. 699 (1960).
55. There have been instances of legislative abrogation of nonfeasance rules. See, e.g., VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973) (providing that "[a] person who knows that another is exposed
to grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril
to himself or without interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance
to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others"); see also Frank-
lin, Vermont Requires a Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1972).
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b. A Different Look at the Privity Requirement
In 1916 in the United States, in the case of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.,56 and in 1932 in the United Kingdom, in the case of Dono-
ghue v. Stevenson,51 courts abandoned the long standing requirement
that privity of contract must exist between the plaintiff and defendant
before finding that the defendant had a duty to exercise due care.58 The
fact that courts could have grafted a contract requirement on duties
that now seem so clearly to arise independently of any contractual obli-
gation has disturbed many commentators. 9 Probably the most common
explanation for the formulation of the rule links the restrictive nature
of the privity doctrine with a judicial desire to further the industrial
revolution. The privity doctrine was said to be "an effective instrument
of social policy for a nation bent on promoting the development of its
infant industry. '6 0
Support can be found in some of the leading cases for the notion
that the privity requirement was formulated as an artificial limitation
on a manufacturer's liability by, in essence, making the consumer subsi-
dize developing industry. In Winterbottom v. Wright, for example,
Lord Abinger asserted that "[u]nless we confine the operation of such
contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd
56. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
57. [1932] App. Cas. 562.
58. For a statement of the privity requirement, see National Sav. Bank of D.C. v. Ward, 100
U.S. 195 (1879), and Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees. & Wels. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842);
see also Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other than Their Immediate Vendees, 45
LAW Q. REV. 343 (1929).
59. See, e.g., Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 41, 54-55 (1934) (not-
ing that "the hypothesis of 'privity of contract' was so strong upon the Court of Exchequer in
Winterbottom v. Wright that they failed to see that in the tort of negligence the defendant's liabil-
ity ought to be determined without paying any regard to the existence of a contract between the
defendant and a third party; that the inoculation of this tort with the idea of duty was inconsistent
with many a case of it down to 1842; and that in every previous case of it where there had been no
complication of the facts with such a contract, the plaintiff had been able to sue without proving
any such [contractual] duty").
Professor Winfield also noted, however, that many different types of cases fell under the old
action of assumpsit and therefore in the earlier cases there had been no reason to decide cases by
reference to the classifications of tort or contract. He observed: "To the accusation, 'Your dicta
show a confusion of contract with tort,' the judges in Winterbottom v. Wright might well have
retorted, 'How can we confuse things which have never been distinguished?'" Id. at 86 (emphasis
in original).
60. W. KEETON, D. OWEN, & J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, CASES AND
MATERIALS 25 (1980); see also Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort (pt.
3), 53 AM. L. REG. 337, 355 (1905) (arguing that "[t]o encourage commerce and industry by remov-
ing all duty and incentive to protect the public is to invite wholesale sacrifice of individual rights
on the altar of commercial greed.. . . It would appear to be high time to consider whether this
price is not too high to pay for industrial expansion, and whether those who profit by the operation
of a business should not bear at least the burden of exercising reasonable competence and care
therein" (footnote omitted)).
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and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would en-
sue."61 Similarly, the court in Curtin v. Somerset 2 explained:
If a contractor who erects a house, who builds a bridge, or performs any other work,
the manufacturer who constructs a boiler, piece of machinery, or a steam-ship,
owes a duty to the whole world, that his work or his machine or his steam-ship
shall contain no hidden defect, it is difficult to measure the extent of his responsi-
bility, and no prudent man would engage in such occupations upon such conditions.
It is safer and wiser to confine such liabilities to the parties immediately
concerned. 3
However, the notion that courts formulated the doctrine solely to
protect the manufacturer seems incomplete if offered as a unitary ex-
planation. First, in the mid-nineteenth century, when Winterbottom
was decided, the English judiciary, as a class, was not linked closely to
the industrialists.6 Second, because manufacturers generally sold di-
rectly to consumers, the privity requirement did not serve as a bar to
the same extent that it did by the time the privity requirement was
rejected. 5 By 1916 manufacturers were no longer selling directly to the
consumer, most notably in cases involving the marketing of dangerous
items likely to cause injury and give rise to tort liability.6 6 As Chief
Judge Cardozo pointed out in MacPherson, the privity rule prevented
anyone but the dealer from suing the manufacturer when "[t]he dealer
was . . . the one person of whom it might be said with some approach
to certainty that by him the car would not be used.""7 Arguably, it was
61. 10 Mees. & Wels. 109, 114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842).
62. 140 Pa. 70, 21 A. 244 (1891).
63. Id. at 80, 21 A. at 245.
64. See Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952)
(commenting on the decision in Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865)).
Professor Morris noted:
It has been suggested that most of the judges were recruited from the gentry, a class which
frowned on the industrial invasion of the stately English countryside. Mills were no longer
picturesque grinders of home-grown grain for kitchen-baked bread; they were unsightly, un-
gainly, "non-natural" textile factories run by men "in trade." They should at least pay their
way-which included paying for damage done to neighbors.
Id. at 1175.
65. See Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other than Their Immediate Vend-
ees, 24 VA. L. REV. 134 (1937) (noting that "[i]n earlier times the one who made the article gener-
ally sold it directly to the ultimate user, and thus the consumer, being in privity of contract with
the manufacturer, was allowed to recover on the usual warranties for losses caused by defective
workmanship").
66. Id. at 155-56. Professor Jeanblanc noted:
[Oither courts, in an effort to keep law apace with the changing systems of marketing ...
have expanded many theories of legal liability.
... To obviate the harshness of [the privity] rule exceptions were soon made, and under
the guise of the "dangerous instrumentality doctrine" these exceptions became more impor-
tant than the rule itself.
Id.
67. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
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the change in marketing practices that increased the harshness of the
privity doctrine to the point at which the doctrine became intolerable.6 8
However, if nothing else, the privity requirement served to ensure
that tort liability was linked to the receipt of economic gain in the par-
ticular case confronting the court. If the transaction lacked considera-
tion, the seller was immunized from tort liability. Even if there was
consideration for the contract between the defendant and some third
party, the economic benefit to the defendant did not flow directly from
the plaintiff, and therefore the negligent manufacturer logically could
be seen as a gratuitous donor with respect to the plaintiff.
What Judge Cardozo and Lord Atkin accomplished in MacPherson
and Donoghue, respectively, was not to eliminate the coupling of tort
liability with the economic gain motive of the manufacturer. Rather,
the courts, by taking a broader view of the transaction, permitted tort
liability even when the defendant's economic gain did not flow directly
from the plaintiff. The previously existing rules exculpating the gratui-
tous donor or bailor, for example, were unaffected by the expansion of
the scope of a manufacturers' duty."
3. The Legislative Response to Abrogation of the "No Liability"
Rules-The "Good Samaritan" Legislation
To this point, this Article has examined three types of legal rules.
The charitable immunity doctrine and the privity rule served to immu-
nize the altruist or gratuitous actor from tort liability. While the non-
feasance immunity rule often imposed liability on the altruist, it also
provided the altruistic rescuer with increased rights."0
The history of these rules is worth briefly noting. All three doc-
trines were judicially developed, originating in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. Each developed rapidly and achieved the greatest recognition
during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the
twentieth century. At that point, under a flood of academic criticism,
the courts repudiated the privity rule and the charitable immunity doc-
trine. The rule of nonfeasance immunity, on the other hand, remained
intact, notwithstanding significant criticism from legal commentators.1
68. Of course, nonpurchasing users and bystanders were prevented effectively from maintain-
ing tort actions against a manufacturer even in cases in which the manufacturer did sell directly to
the public.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 99-111.
70. See supra notes 46, 48 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Note, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 COLUM. L.
REv. 1301, 1322 (1964) (arguing for the imposition of an affirmative duty to rescue on physicians
and concluding that "[t]he imposition of affirmative obligations on any group of persons is neither
historically unjustifiable nor repugnant to the moral sensibilities of society").
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The public's reaction to the judicial abrogation of the privity and
charitable immunity rules and to the failure to abrogate that part of the
nonfeasance immunity rule that served to impose liability on the gratui-
tous actor has been manifested in the legislature's rejection of attempts
to impose liability on those perceived to be motivated by altruism.
While relevant legislation purports to retain civil liability for those per-
ceived to be acting for economic gain, these statutes have been underin-
clusive in this regard, immunizing many persons who are in fact
economically motivated. For example, since 1959,72 all fifty states and
the District of Columbia have enacted "Good Samaritan" laws immu-
nizing physicians and other health care professionals from liability for
negligence that occurs while rendering emergency service when they
were under no duty to have acted at all.7 3 The "Good Samaritan" legis-
lation not only modified the nonfeasance immunity rule, but also served
partially to reestablish both the privity doctrine and the charitable im-
munity doctrine.
a. Immunity for the Medical Volunteer
i. Modification of the Nonfeasance Rule
As previously noted, one of the major exceptions to the nonfea-
sance immunity rule imposes a duty to act with reasonable care on the
innocent passer-by once he commences his gratuitous rescue attempt.74
In the case of health care professionals, it was claimed that physicians
refused to render emergency treatment outside the hospital for fear of
subsequent malpractice liability.75 Responding to this perception, the
states enacted legislation immunizing physicians and other health care
professionals who did render emergency treatment.76 However, it ap-
72. The first "Good Samaritan" law appears to have been enacted in California in 1959. The
law, 1959 Cal. Stat. 1507, is now CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2144 (West Supp. 1987).
73. See Note, Good Samaritans and Hospital Emergencies, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 417, 428 nn.74-
78 (1981) (collecting statutes).
74. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
75. Note, supra note 71, at 1301. One commentator, summarizing the frequently expressed
perception, wrote:
A skier who had fallen in pain upon a slope in the Sierra Madre mountains was refused
attention by several physicians in the vicinity. On the Bronx Whitestone Bridge, a motorist
lay in need of urgent medical attention as a physician drove past and deliberately declined to
stop. In each instance the doctors were deterred by the awareness that, in the rendering of
assistance, any allegeable failure to perform the task with reasonable care would expose them
to possible suit for malpractice. The physicians realized that, on the other hand, they could
ignore the injured person with complete immunity. For at common law it is the "Good Samar-
itan" who "may find himself liable where those who passed by on the other side will not."
Id.
76. See Colby v. Schwartz, 78 Cal. App. 3d 885, 892, 144 Cal. Rptr. 624, 628 (1978) (asserting
that the statutes were enacted "to aid the class of individuals who, though requiring immediate
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pears that the statutes provided immunity in circumstances far beyond
the road side emergency situation.
Significantly, although much of this legislation sought to immunize
health care professionals when they were acting under the pressure of
emergencies, attempts were made to claim that such "emergency" lan-
guage included negligence that occurred in the hospital emergency
room.77 The most likely explanation for what otherwise would be re-
garded as an anomaly, is that health care professionals generally, and
physicians specifically, are perceived to be acting altruistically even
when their conduct is clearly economically motivated.7"
ii. Pre-existing Doctor-Patient Relationship: Reestablishment of the
Privity Doctrine
To ensure that the health care professional's civil liability is linked
to a motive of seeking economic gain, "Good Samaritan" legislation fre-
quently provided that immunity would exist only when no doctor-
patient or nurse-patient relationship existed prior to such emergency. 7
Because the physician-patient relationship is generally contractual, 0
proof of the existence of such a relationship operates to ensure the exis-
tence of consideration as a prerequisite to civil liability."
Unfortunately, however, the same problem exists in this context as
existed in the products liability cases prior to MacPherson v. Buick
medical care, were not receiving it").
77. In 1976, for example, the definition of "scene of the emergency" in CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE: § 2144 was amended to include "emergency rooms of hospitals in the event of a medical
disaster." 1976 Cal. Stat. 824, § 1. When the physician is acting under the pressure of an unex-
pected emergency such as chancing upon a highway accident, his rendering of assistance would be
perceived to be noneconomically motivated even though he could later seek compensation for his
services. See Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907); Piggee v. Mercy Hosp., 199
Okla. 411, 186 P.2d 817 (1947). Regarding after the fact compensation for the altruist, see gener-
ally Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An Economic
Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978).
In a hospital emergency room, however, the E.R. physician clearly has an economic gain moti-
vation having put himself in a position in which he is contractually obligated to render the service.
See generally Note, supra note 73.
78. See supra text accompanying note 7.
79. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1501 (West 1987).
80. Keene v. Wiggins, 69 Cal. App. 3d 308, 313, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3, 6-7 (1977). In this context,
it should be noted that the various jurisdictions are by no means agreed as to the precise charac-
terization of the physician-patient relationship. In addition to the Keene characterization as "con-
tractual," other courts have called it "quasi-contractual" or simply attempted to avoid the
characterization problem by calling it "sui generis."
81. Some states have expressly legislated in terms of economic gain motivation rather than
"privity." See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. la (Vernon 1969) (immunity not granted when
services provided "for remuneration or with the expectation of remuneration"); see also CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557b (West Supp. 1987) ("voluntarily and gratuitously"); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-1152 (1964) (aid rendered "gratuitously").
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Motor Co. 82 By requiring the consideration to flow from the plaintiff to
the defendant, rather than from anyone to the defendant, many persons
are treated as altruists, even though it is clear that their conduct is
economically motivated. In McKenna v. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital,8
for example, the court did not hold the defendant liable for malpractice
that allegedly occurred while he was responding to a hospital emer-
gency, although not in the emergency room itself.84 The court reasoned
that because there was no pre-existing physician-patient relationship
between the defendant and plaintiff, no liability could be imposed.8 5
Similarly, under section 1317 of the California Health and Safety Code,
hospital "rescue teams '8 6 are not held liable for acts "done or omitted
while attempting to resuscitate any person who is in immediate danger
of loss of life . . . if good faith is exercised. 8 7 As one writer observed,
"section 1317 constitutes a total obstruction of the rights of the hospital
patient. Even if the physician does not remotely qualify as a 'medical
volunteer,' he is still provided with immunity from civil liability."88
b. Immunity of the Hospital
In addition to the charitable immunity rules that protected hospi-
tals from vicarious liability for the acts of their agents and employees,
hospitals could frequently take advantage of common-law agency prin-
ciples and successfully argue that there was no vicarious liability be-
cause the negligent physician was an independent contractor. In
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,9 for example, Judge
Cardozo reasoned that a hospital could not exercise sufficient control
82. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); see supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
83. 93 Cal. App. 3d 282, 155 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1979).
84. Id. at 288, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 635. But cf. Colby v. Schwartz, 78 Cal. App. 3d 885, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 624 (1978) (holding that the immunity provided under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2144 was
not available to an emergency room physician); see also Note, supra note 73 (discussing and ana-
lyzing these cases).
85. McKenna, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 288, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
86. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317 (West 1979). This section defines a "rescue team" as
"a special group of physicians and surgeons, nurses, and employees of a health facility who have
been trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation and have been designated by the health facility to
attempt, in cases of emergency, to resuscitate persons who are in immediate danger of loss of life."
Id.
87. Id.
88. Note, supra note 73, at 434. Immunization of the physician from civil liability for negli-
gence that occurs in the emergency room is, incidentally, no small matter. One study indicated
that "[s]eventy percent of the malpractice incidents in Maryland between 1960 and 1970 occurred
in hospitals, with fourteen percent occurring in emergency rooms." Brook, Brutoco & Williams,
The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and the Quality of Care, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1197,
1207 n.51.
89. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
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over a physician. Therefore, there could be no vicarious liability. 0
Today, as a general rule, the majority of states have rejected the
professional skill theory and find that there can be such a thing as a
"servant-physician.""1 This does not mean, however, that hospitals will
be vicariously liable for every instance of malpractice that occurs at the
institution. If the physician is an employee or an ostensible agent, the
hospital will be responsible. If, on the other hand, the physician is only
utilizing hospital privileges to treat a private patient, it is likely that he
will be considered an independent contractor.9"
The mere fact that the physician is statutorily immune from civil
liability will not, by itself, inure to the benefit of the hospital. It is gen-
erally agreed that there is no derivative immunity in the absence of a
statute.93 It is not uncommon, however, for the "Good Samaritan" legis-
lation to immunize not only the negligent actor, but his principal as
well. For example, section 1317 of the California Health and Safety
Code not only protects the "rescue team" but also protects the owners
or operators of the hospital or authorized emergency vehicle.9 4
Once again, it is clear that the legislative enactments must be ex-
plained in terms of the legislature seeking to immunize those individu-
als who may be perceived to be acting altruistically, notwithstanding
the fact that courts previously have rejected as illogical those doctrines
that achieved the same result in favor of a motivation-neutral set of
rules.
B. Varying Standards of Care
1. Occupier Liability
In addition to those areas of tort law in which the perception of
altruistic motivation has been used to justify an outright exculpation of
the negligent actor, there are areas in which the perception of the ac-
90. Id. at 131-32, 105 N.E. at 94.
91. See generally Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility
for Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REV. 385 (1975).
92. Mayers v. Litow, 154 Cal. App. 2d 413, 316 P.2d 351 (1951); Lundahl v. Rockford Memo-
rial Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. App. 2d 671, 235 N.E.2d 461 (1968); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407,
227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967); Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 14 S.E.2d 643 (1941).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217(b)(ii) (1958); see also Hamburger v. Henry Ford
Hosp., 91 Mich. App. 580, 284 N.W.2d 155 (1979).
94. Cf. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.5 (1985). This statute is virtually identical to the California
statute and protects the principal from vicarious liability. However, it provides:
This section shall not relieve the owners or operators of the hospital or authorized emergency
vehicle of any other duty imposed upon them by law for the designation and training of mem-
bers of a rescue team or for any provisions regarding maintenance of equipment to be used by
the rescue team or any damages resulting from gross negligence or wanton acts or omissions.
Id. See generally infra text accompanying notes 95-128 (regarding varying standards of care).
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tor's motivation affects the standard of care. One example is the tradi-
tional distinction between the standard of care a land occupier owes
invitees and the standard he owes licensees. Under the traditional rule,
an occupier owes an invitee a duty to exercise reasonable care to pre-
vent damage from unusual dangers of which the occupier knows or
ought to know. 5 However, if the plaintiff was merely a licensee, the
occupier need only refrain from creating a trap or warn about the pres-
ence of a concealed danger of which he has actual knowledge." The
Restatement of Torts97 identified the theoretical basis for distinguish-
ing licensees from invitees as one of economic benefits conferred. Ac-
cording to Professor William Prosser, the Restatement reasoned:
The duty of affirmative care to make the premises safe is imposed upon the person
in possession as the price he must pay for the economic benefit he derives, or ex-
pects to derive, from the presence of the visitor; and that when no such benefit is to
be found, he is under no such duty. On this basis, the "business" on which the
visitor comes must be one of at least potential pecuniary profit to the possessor."'
2. Gifts, Loans, and Bailments
Similarly, one can observe a legal tendency to impose a lower stan-
dard of care in cases involving the gratuitous providing of products, re-
gardless of whether the underlying transaction is classified as a loan,
gift, or bailment. This is true particularly when the individual who is
providing the product is not "in the business" of providing such prod-
ucts.9 The traditional English rule relating to the gratuitous loan or
gift of a chattel was that "there is not even the duty of reasonable care.
The donor or lender of a chattel owes no duty except to give warning of
any dangers actually known to him."'100 The duty was so limited that it
led one commentator to assert that there would be liability only for
"willfulness or gross negligence in not revealing a [known] defect."''1
95. Indemaur v. Dames, [1866] 1 L.R.C.P. 274.
96. Latham v. R. Johnson & Nephew Ltd., [1913] 1 K.B. 398.
97. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 332, 343 & 343 comment a (1934).
98. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 61, at 420; see also Marsh, The History and Com-
parative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 LAW Q. REV. 182 (1953); Prosser, Business
Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1942).
99. When one "in the business" provides a product gratuitously, his conduct is usually "eco-
nomic"-falling under the goodwill creation definition. See supra text preceding note 4.
100. J. SALMOND, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE ENGLISH LAW OF LIABILITY FOR CIVIL
INJURIES 464 (6th ed. 1924).
101. P. WINFIELD, A TEXT-BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORT 539 (4th ed. 1948); accord G. PATON,
BAILMENT IN THE COMMON LAW 152 (1952) (stating that "[tihe borrower can recover only if the
lender knows of the defect"). But see Marsh, Liability of the Gratuitous Transferor: A Compara-
tive Study, 66 LAW Q. REV. 39, 47 (1950). After a thoughtful analysis of the English cases upon
which Professors Winfield and Salmond relied, Professor Marsh concluded:
[T]here was no reason to except gratuitous bailnents and gifts from [the] principles [impos-
ing a general duty of care based on reasonable foresight]. The privileged position of the gratu-
1988]
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The American cases tend to be consistent with their older English
counterparts. In Ruth v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 02 for example, the de-
fendants gratuitously provided the plaintiffs with a propane heater for
the plaintiffs to use on a hunting trip. The heater installed in the plain-
tiffs' trailer was not adequately vented. This caused carbon monoxide
to accumulate, injuring one hunter and killing four others. The court
held that the gratuitous donor was under no duty. Furthermore, a
bailor is under no greater duty to third persons than to the immediate
bailee,0 s i.e., a duty to warn of known dangers.
The commercial lessor or bailor for hire, on the other hand, is held
to a higher standard of care. In Hyman v. Nye, 04 for example, the
plaintiff hired a carriage and horses from the defendant. While it was
being used, a bolt in the carriage broke, causing the carriage to over-
turn. The court instructed the jury that if the defendant took reasona-
ble care to provide a fit and proper vehicle, he was not liable. The jury
returned a verdict for defendant, finding that the defect was not discov-
erable by ordinary inspection. On appeal it was held that the instruc-
tion was wrong. According to two of the judges, the defendant had a
duty to supply a carriage that was as fit for the purpose for which it was
hired as care and skill could make it.'0 5 Although the lessor was not an
insurer against all defects, he was an insurer against all defects against
which care and skill could guard. 06
The more modern view, at least in the United States, is to treat the
commercial lessor as if he were a seller. 0 7 This treatment will, at least,
impose a duty of reasonable inspection, and increasingly, subject the
commercial lessor to strict liability.'08
Not surprisingly, the liability of a bailee also depends on antici-
itous bailor or donor had not been a deliberately conceived exception to a general principle of
liability, but merely an illustration of the undeveloped state of the law of tort in the nine-
teenth century.
Id.
102. 209 Minn. 248, 296 N.W. 136 (1942); see also The Pegeen, 14 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Cal.
1936); Davis v. Sanderman, 225 Iowa 1001, 282 N.W. 717 (1940); Gagnon v. Dana, 69 N.H. 264, 39
A. 982 (1897). But cf. Nesmith v. Magnolia Petroleum, 82 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
103. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 104, at 717.
104. [18811 6 L.R.-Q.B. 685.
105. Id. at 688, 690 (Lindley & Mathew, J.J.).
106. Id. at 687 (Lindley, J.). The English authorities are far from uniform as to the precise
standard of care. There are three standards: (a) reasonable care to make reasonably safe, see Fel-
ston Tile Co., Ltd. v. Winget Ltd., [1936] 3 All E.R. 473, 477; (b) duty to provide reasonably safe
thing, see Hyman v. Nye, [1881] 6 L.R.-Q.B. 685; and (c) absolute guarantee of fitness, see Chew v.
Jones, 10 L.T.R. 231 (1847) (Pollock, C.B.). Whatever standard is applied, however, is certain to be
stricter than that to which a gratuitous bailor is held.
107. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 104, at 715.
108. See, e.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965).
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pated economic gain. The traditional rule holds that if the bailee re-
ceives payment, he will be held to a higher standard of care; at the very
least he will be held to a standard of reasonable care,10 9 and there is
substantial authority that his duty may go beyond this.110 If, however,
the bailment is for the exclusive benefit of the bailor, the gratuitous
bailee is liable only for gross negligence."'
3. Services Provided Gratuitously
When services are provided gratuitously, the older cases appeared
to make a distinction between lay and professional actors. In the case of
physicians, the blackletter rule was that "[tihe same standards of skill
and care apply in the case of gratuitous patients as in the case of those
who pay for the services rendered to them.""' 2 However, in the case of
"non-professionals" who provide services similar to professionals, some
courts appeared to be willing to use the lack of economic motivation as
a point of distinction. For example, in Higgins v. McCabe,"3 a case in-
volving a midwife, the court asserted that "[i]t is often said, that a gra-
tuitous agent is liable for gross negligence only; but, without regard to
degrees of negligence, it is plain that the duty imposed upon such an
agent is less stringent than when the service undertaken is founded
upon a consideration paid." 1 4 Interestingly, a number of jurists also
have sought to reduce the standard of care owed by physicians when
the rendering of services was not gratuitous in any sense." 5 As previ-
109. Searle v. Laverick, [1874] 9 L.R.-Q.B. 122. It should be noted that a common carrier is
arguably an insurer of goods entrusted to it. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
110. Brabant & Co. v. King, [1895] App. Cas. 632, 640 (stating that "under a legal obligation
to exercise the same degree of care, towards the preservation of the goods entrusted to them from
injury, which might reasonably be expected from a skilled storekeeper, acquainted with the risks to
be apprehended either from the character of the storehouse itself or of its locality; and that obliga-
tion included, not only the duty of taking all reasonable precautions to obviate these risks, but the
duty of taking all proper measures for the protection of the goods when such risks were imminent
or had actually occurred").
111. Houghland v. Low, [1962] 1 L.R.-Q.B. 694, 698; Campbell v. Pickard, 30 D.L.R.2d 152
(1961); see also N. PALMER, BAILMENT 330-39 (1979); G. PATON, supra note 101, at 97. But cf.
Recent Case, Bailments-Gratuitous Bailments-Degree of Care Required of Bailee, 34 HARV. L.
REv. 82, 83 (1920).
112. 41 AM. JuL. 2D Physicians and Surgeons § 207 (1981) (footnote omitted); Annotation,
Duty and Liability of Physician or Surgeon in Pregnancy and Childbirth Cases, 141 A.L.R. 111
(1942).
113. 126 Mass. 13 (1878).
114. Id. at 20. Along the same lines, a number of cases have held that when one voluntarily
assumes to care for an injured person, he is liable only for gross or wanton negligence. See Stater v.
Illinois C. R. Co., 209 F. 480 (M.D. Tenn. 1911); Fitzgerald v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 116 W. Va.
239, 180 S.E. 766 (1935).
115. See, e.g., Whitehouse v. Jordan, [1980] 1 All E.R. 650 (finding that defendant physi-
cian's conduct in having pulled too long and too hard with forceps during a delivery amounted
only to "an error of clinical judgment and as such was not negligence" as a matter of law), rev'd,
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ously noted, the same result may flow from various interpretations of
"Good Samaritan" legislation.116 Once again, it is the desire to protect
those who act for noneconomic motives that underlies the reduced lia-
bility for gratuitous actors.
4. The Guest Passenger Cases and Statutes
The guest passenger doctrine arose out of either the occupier liabil-
ity cases, the gratuitous bailment cases, or both.117 During the latter
part of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century,
Australian, Canadian, and a few American courts developed legal rules
that limited an automobile driver's liability to his nonpaying passen-
gers."18 The rule protected the driver by requiring a finding of some
misconduct more extreme than mere negligence-gross negligence, will-
ful or wanton misconduct, or recklessness-as a condition of imposing
liability.
By contrast, when the driver was motivated by economic gain, not
only did courts impose liability, but they frequently imposed a higher
standard of care. The common carrier cases illustrate this tendency. Al-
though the actual standard of care owed by common carriers to their
passengers is probably no more than the normal "reasonable man in the
circumstances,"19 courts routinely have described the duty as that of
[1981] 1 All E.R. 267, 277 (Edmund-Davies, L.J.) (noting that "where you get a situation which
involves the use of some special skill or competence, then the test as to whether there has been
negligence or not is not the test of the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus because he has not
got this special skill. The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing
to have that special skill. If a surgeon fails to measure up to that standard in any respect ('clinical
judgment' or otherwise), he has been negligent and should be so adjudged" (citation omitted) (em-
phasis added)); see also Note, The Standard of Skill and Care Governing the Civil Liability of
Physicians, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (1929) (suggesting that early in the development of common-law
rules, physicians were liable only for gross negligence).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 76-88. A significant number of the Good Samaritan
statutes are phrased in terms of a reduced standard of care. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-309(c), 5-310(2) (1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-714 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.23 (Anderson 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-6-218, 68-27-202 (1983).
117. Professor Prosser traces the guest laws to the "lower level of care assumed by a bailee in
a gratuitous undertaking." See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 34, at 215. Professor Fleming
finds the origin in the extension of the "regime of occupancy duties . . . to motorcars and other
conveyances." J. FLEMING, supra note 42, at 439. Professor Fleming also notes, however, that "the
analogy of gratuitous bailments lent some support also to the view that guest passengers could
only complain of 'gross' negligence." Id.; see also Comment, The Common Law Basis of Automo-
bile Guest Statutes, 43 U. Cm. L. Rav. 798 (1976).
118. See Moffat v. Bateman, [1869] 3 L.R.-C.P. 115; see also West v. Poor, 196 Mass. 183, 81
N.E. 960 (1907); MacArthur, Gross Negligence and the Guest Passenger, 38 CAN. B. REV. 47
(1960).
119. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 34, at 209. Professor Prosser argued:
Although the language used by the courts sometimes seems to indicate that a special standard
is being applied, it would appear that none of these cases should logically call for any depar-
ture from the usual formula. What is required is merely the conduct of the reasonable person
1988] MOTIVATION AND TORT
"the highest degree of vigilance"'120 or "the utmost caution.' 121 In addi-
tion, some courts have required that juries receive an instruction in
terms of a higher or the highest degree of care, and failure to give that
instruction may constitute reversible error.'22
The attempt by some judges to protect the altruist by the formula-
tion of different standards of care did not receive widespread judicial
support. 23 However, the legislative support for such a result was over-
whelming. According to Professor Prosser, between 1927 and 1939,
more than half the states enacted some form of automobile guest stat-
ute that protected the negligent driver under circumstances in which
providing a ride was not motivated by a desire for economic gain. 24
Most commonly, writers attribute the enactment of this type of leg-
islation to the lobbying efforts of the insurance industry. 25 However,
such an explanation is necessarily incomplete even if partially true. 26
Obviously, there are limits on what lobbyists can accomplish when it
comes to relatively high profile legislation, such as that which affects
the driving public. Had this type of law been politically unacceptable to
the voter, the legislative success never would have approached the level
actually reached. Clearly, these laws must have had enormous popular
appeal. The principal justification of "hospitality protection" for drivers
of ordinary prudence under the circumstances, and the greater danger, or the greater respon-
sibility, is merely one of the circumstances, demanding only an increased amount of care.
Id. (footnote omitted).
120. Orr v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 349 So. 2d 417, 419 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
121. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451, 456 (1880).
122. See, e.g., Van Hoose v. Blueflame Gas, Inc., 642 P.2d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); see also
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 34, at 209. It is probably also worth noting in this context
that when a common carrier accepts goods to be transported, its duty is so high that they are
arguably an insurer of the goods. See, e.g., Convey-All Corp. v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co.,
Inc., 120 Cal. App. 3d 116, 174 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1981).
123. See Comment, supra note 117, at 798, 811-14. Only a handful of states adopted differing
standards of care by judicial decision. The majority of courts rejected the doctrine by holding that
"the automobile driver owed his guest passenger a duty of ordinary care-the same duty owed to
such strangers as pedestrians and other drivers." Id. at 813.
124. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 34, at 215; see also Comment, The Constitutional-
ity of Automobile Guest Statutes: A Roadmap to the Recent Equal Protection Challenges, 1975
B.Y.U. L. Rav. 99 n.1 (collecting statutes).
125. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 34, at 215; see also Stevens v. Stevens, 355 Mich.
363, 94 N.W.2d 858 (1959); Allen, Why Do Courts Coddle Automobile Indemnity Companies?, 61
AM. L. REv. 77 (1927); White, The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-Paying Passenger,
20 VA. L. REv. 326 (1934).
126. It is not clear why the insurance industry would consider such legislation high priority.
While decreased exposure to their insureds resulting from such legislation could result in lower
premiums or higher profits in the short run if premiums are unchanged, because all companies
within the state market would obtain equal benefit, their competitive position with regard to one
another would be relatively unchanged. In fact, supposedly there was no complaint when the laws
were repealed in Florida and Vermont. See PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 32, § 34, at 215; Note,
The Present Status of Automobile Guest Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 676-78 (1974).
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is "based upon the apparent unfairness of permitting an ungrateful
non-paying guest, perhaps a hitch-hiker, to force a large financial bur-
den upon a possibly uninsured host driver, and the resulting discour-
agement of hospitality by motorists.' 2 7
The cases that tend to exculpate the gratuitous actor or nonbusi-
ness donee by holding him to a lower standard of care have never been
accepted enough to be considered to be in the mainstream of tort the-
ory. However, their very existence suggests an underlying community
belief that it is unfair to impose liability on the altruist and, at the
same time, that acting for economic gain is a suspect motivation. As in
the case of the immunity rules, this community sense is further illus-
trated by the legislative response to the general judicial reluctance to
use the actor's motive to distinguish between otherwise identical cases.
For example, while it was clear to judges in a majority of jurisdictions
that a negligent driver should be held to the same standard of care,
regardless of whether or not he was acting for economic gain, the major-
ity of state statutes use that same economic gain criterion to bring tort
doctrine into line with the community's sense of justice.'28
C. Nature and Extent of Damages
1. The Emergence of an Expanded Concept of Punitive Damages
Liability
The motivation of the actor also may explain the sudden emer-
gence of punitive damages liability under circumstances in which puni-
tive damages were unavailable under the common law. Traditionally,
formal tort doctrine insisted that the defendant must have acted in a
willful or malicious manner in order to justify the award of punitive
damages. The award of such damages was possible in cases of assault,
battery, deceit, or defamation to name a few. The specific tort, however,
is less important than "the defendant's motives and conduct in commit-
ting it.'12e Generally, the relevant motive had been one of spite or ill-
will-a type described earlier as "noneconomic, second-party fo-
cused."' 30 During the last twenty years or so, however, a virtual revolu-
127. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 34, at 215 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
128. A similar point was made in Comment, supra note 117, at 801. The author asserted that
the guest statutes were founded on "conscious legislative decisions to adopt the common law rule
which distinguished on the grounds of natural justice between the duties of care owed by a host
driver who is compensated and one who is not." Id.; see also Elliot, Degrees of Negligence, 6 S.
CAL. L. REV. 91, 133 (1933).
The idea of "hospitality protection" frequently is cited as the primary purpose this type of
legislation serves. See Comment, supra note 117, at 800.
129. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 2, at 11.
130. See supra text following note 3.
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tion has occurred on both sides of the Atlantic in which the traditional
notion that punitive damages should be justified only by
'"noneconomic" motivation has been either rejected in favor of an eco-
nomic motivation criterion or supplemented by the addition of an eco-
nomic motivation criterion.
In the United Kingdom the shift occurred abruptly when the
House of Lords decided Rookes v. Barnard,13 1 and in an unusual depar-
ture from established law, abolished punitive damages liability in all
but three circumstances. The first and third categories, which are not
relevant to the discussion here, permit punitive damages in cases in
which public officials have abused or grossly exceeded the scope of their
authority and cases in which punitive damages are expressly authorized
by statute. The second category, however, allows punitive damages in
cases in which "the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to
make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation pay-
able to the plaintiff. ' 132 Lord Devlin reasoned that:
Where a defendant with a cynical disregard for a plaintiff's rights has calculated
that the money to be made out of his wrongdoing will probably exceed the damages
at risk, it is necessary for the law to show that it cannot be broken with impunity.
This category is not confined to moneymaking in the strict sense. It extends to
cases in which the defendant is seeking to gain at the expense of the plaintiff some
object-perhaps some property which he covets-which either he could not obtain
at all or not obtain except at a price greater than he wants to put down. Exemplary
damages can properly be awarded whenever it is necessary to teach a wrongdoer
that tort does not pay.
133
There are at least two observations worth making with regard to
the English position on the availability of punitive damages. First, the
decision in Rookes did not simply expand the definition of malice, as
was done in the United States, in order to provide an additional basis
for punitive damages awards. Rather, the decision essentially abolished
noneconomic, second-party focused conduct as a basis for punitive
damages liability. The only exceptions were for the misconduct of pub-
lic officials and for express legislation-exceptions that are best ex-
plained in political or constitutional terms, such as providing a check on
the executive and acknowledging legislative supremacy.
The abolition of noneconomic, second-party focused conduct as a
basis for punitive damages drew the greatest criticism from the English
judiciary. A judge in the Court of Appeal asked:
Why should the man who commits a tort calculating that he will make more money
131. [1964] App. Cas. 1129, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367 (Devlin, L.J.); see also Bell v. Midland Ry.
Co., [1861] C.B.N.S. 287, 304; Williams v. Currie, [1845] 1 C.B. 841, 848; Crouch v. Great N. Ry.
Co., [1856] 11 Ex. 742, 759.
132. Rookes, [1964] App. Cas. at 1226, [1964] 1 All E.R. at 410.
133. Id. at 1227, [1964] 1 All E.R. at 410-11.
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out of it than any damages and costs which he will have to pay be less favourably
regarded by the law than the man who, out of venomous malice, commits a tort in
order to break an innocent neighbour regardless of the cost?13'
In fact, the reaction to the House of Lords' abolition of punitive dam-
ages in noneconomic, second-party focused conduct cases was so ex-
treme that the Court of Appeal, in a truly remarkable, but ultimately
futile effort, sought to declare the decision of the House of Lords to
have been invalid.'
The second point worth noting is that the English courts have been
extremely careful to allow punitive damages only if the particular act
alleged was motivated by economic gain. The mere fact that the de-
fendant operates a commercial enterprise and that the tortious act oc-
curred in the course of carrying out that enterprise is not sufficient to
justify punitive damages under the new rule. The particular tortious act
itself must have been economically motivated.'36
In the United States the shift has been more gradual, though it
may prove to be more significant in the final analysis. The expansion of
punitive damages liability to encompass economic gain motivation has
occurred in two stages. Traditionally, punitive damages were generally
not available in the absence of intentional conduct motivated by malice.
Malice was defined as "spite or ill will," what this Article has referred
to as noneconomic, second-party focused conduct. 37 In an unrelated se-
ries of cases, that standard was altered to allow punitive damages in
cases in which the defendant's conduct was best characterized as unin-
tentional and self-focused, but high risk. 38 In circumstances in which
the defendant's conduct could be fairly characterized as "wilful, wanton
or reckless," courts would treat that conduct as the equivalent of malice
134. Broome v. Cassell & Co., [1971] 2 All E.R. 187, 205, [1971] 2 W.L.R. 853, 869-70, rev'd,
[1972] 1 All E.R. 801; see also McGregor, In Defence of Lord Devlin, 34 MOD. L. REv. 520, 525
(1971) (arguing that "the real purpose behind Lord Devlin's second category is not the punishment
of the defendant but the prevention of his unjust enrichment, and that this category is therefore
more appropriately viewed as an extension of the remedies available through waiver of tort and an
account of profits").
135. Broome v. Cassell & Co., [1971] 2 All E.R. 187, [1971] 2 W.L.R. 853, rev'd, [1972] 1 All
E.R. 801. To understand the basis of the Court of Appeal decision one must keep in mind that
until the Practice Statement of 1966, the House of Lords refused to recognize its power to overrule
its own decisions. The Court of Appeal judges argued that Rookes conflicted with earlier House of
Lords decisions and this fact was not considered by the House of Lords in the course of deciding
Rookes. As a result, it was claimed that the 1964 decision was decided per incuriam, and was
therefore invalid. Id. at 199-200, 2 W.L.R. at 870-71; see McGregor, supra note 134, at 520-22.
136. See, e.g., Manson v. Associated Newspapers, [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1038, 1045; Broadway Ap-
provals v. Odham Press, [1965] 2 All E.R. 523; see also Fridman, Punitive Damages in Tort, 48
CAN. B. REv. 373, 386-87 (1970).
137. See supra text following note 3.
138. See generally Kotler, Imposing Punitive Damage Liability on the Intoxicated Driver,
18 AKRON L. RaV. 255 (1984).
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for purposes of imposing punitive damages liability.13 9
Having modified the traditional punitive damages standard, the
question became what type of conduct would prove the existence of a
state of mind sufficiently culpable to be the equivalent of malice. Given
the long standing suspicion towards those acting for their own economic
benefit, it is not at all surprising to find judicial decisions describing
manufacturers' design choices based on cost considerations as "mali-
cious" or the "legal equivalent of malice" when those choices were made
with the knowledge that persons would be injured as a result.140
Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,"' for example, was a products lia-
bility case in which a young child was seriously burned when her night
gown caught fire. The claim against the fabric manufacturer was based
on its failure to treat the fabric with a flame retardant chemical. In
finding that the defendant's failure in this regard was sufficiently culpa-
ble to support an award of punitive damages, the court stated:
In April 1968, a letter from an official of [the defendant] explained that satisfactory
runs were made with flame-retarded flannelette using various chemicals, but that
[the defendant] was not going to use these products until federal law so required
because of the cost factor. Plaintiffs' witnesses testified that the cost of flame-re-
tardant fabrics would not make them unmarketable. Thus, it may be inferred from
this letter that the decision not to use flame-retardant cotton flannelette was
merely an economic one for the benefit of [the defendant]. 142
The argument in favor of imposing punitive damages in these cases
focuses on the asserted violation of "basic principles of fairness and mo-
rality."" At the core of this perceived immorality is the judgment that
acting to maximize economic gain or profits by marketing products with
the knowledge that injuries will result from the chosen design, despite a
willingness to pay the associated costs by compensation of those in-
jured, is immoral. " One commentator has claimed:
139. Id. at 256-57.
140. This, of course, ignores the fact that many, if not most, cost-based design choices in-
volve a balancing of product cost and accident cost. See G. CALAHRESi, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIc ANALYSIS (1970).
141. 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980).
142. Id. at 740; see also Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615
P.2d 621 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d
757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 198-206); Wangen v.
Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980). Wangen is an interesting variation on the same
theme. It involved a fuel tank explosion in a 1967 Mustang. Plaintiff alleged that Ford knew of the
danger but, nevertheless, refused to recall the model "because Ford wanted to avoid paying the
costs of recall and repair and wanted to avoid the accompanying bad publicity." Id. at 462. The
avoidance of bad publicity is a good example of the "goodwill creating" economic motivation men-
tioned earlier. See supra text following note 3.
143. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1291
(1976).
144. To a certain extent, the attitude expressed by the courts in these cases is contrary to
that hypothesized by Professor Keeton. He argued that it is frequently socially acceptable to cause
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[A] manufacturer should [not] be permitted to abuse the rule [allowing for post-
accident compensation] flagrantly and with impunity by treating the payment of
accident costs merely as a "license fee for the conduct of an illegitimate business."
Yet absent the punitive damages remedy, many manufacturers may be tempted to
maximize profits by marketing products known to be defective and to absorb re-
sulting injury claims as a cost of doing business.15
While many of the problems associated with this argument will be dis-
cussed shortly, 14 6 it is worth noting that the threshold question of
whether a product is "defective" is itself frequently answered with ref-
erence to the same type of cost-benefit analysis that is condemned in
the course of urging a punitive damages solution. 14 7
2. Restrictions on Damages in Medical Malpractice Claims
During the mid-1970s, in response to what was called a "medical
malpractice crisis, "148 many state legislatures enacted highly restrictive
"tort reform" legislation establishing specialized procedures that a
plaintiff must follow to pursue tort causes of action against physicians
and other health care professionals.14 In addition to the "procedural
reforms" that were simply hurdles placed in the path of the injured
individual, many legislatures expressly limited the damages available to
victims of medical malpractice. 150
Substantial similarities exist between the automobile guest statutes
of the first part of this century and the damages limitations in actions
against physicians enacted almost fifty years later. The automobile
guest statutes sought to protect the altruistic driver from liability by
reducing the standard of care the driver owed to his guest. The mal-
practice statutes arbitrarily limited the damages recoverable from the
harm under circumstances in which the tortfeasor is able and willing to compensate the victim. See
Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1959).
145. Owen, supra note 143, at 1291 (footnotes omitted); see also Owen, supra note 9, at 26
(stating that "when a manufacturer knowingly sacrifices the public's greater safety interests to
reap a profit thai it knows is worth much less, punitive damages are in order").
146. See infra text accompanying notes 196-206.
147. Professor Owen himself recognized this problem in his 1982 article. See Owen, supra
note 9, at 24-25, 34. See generally Phillips, The Standards for Determining Defectiveness in Prod-
ucts Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 101 (1977).
148. Interestingly, at the height of the "crisis," one study estimated that only 2.4% of all
patients who sustained hospital injuries because of negligence receive any compensation. See
Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra note 88, at 1208.
149. See generally Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal
Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 (1979); Comment, An Analysis of the State Legisla-
tive Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1417.
150. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.54 (West 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2(b) (Burns
1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B)(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-
14-11 (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.23 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987). See generally Grossman,
State-by-State Summary of Legislative Activities on Medical Malpractice, in A LEGISLATOR'S
GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 12 (D. Warren & R. Merritt eds. 1976).
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health care provider. However, it is quite clear that there is a significant
factual distinction between the individual protected by the guest stat-
utes and those protected by the malpractice legislation. The former
dealt with the individual who gratuitously provided services, while the
latter concerns the delivery of health care services, which is clearly a
"for profit" transaction.
Because of the "for profit" nature of health services, these two ex-
amples of legislation may appear to be inconsistent with the economic
motivation argument. In fact, some commentators made this assertion.
In a Comment dealing in part with the constitutionality of the states'
"malpractice crisis" legislation, the author observed initially that the
1929 case of Silver v. Silver151 upheld the constitutionality of the guest
statutes. It was then argued that:
Since guest statutes completely eliminate a guest's right of action for his host's
merely negligent conduct, they can be viewed as a much more drastic measure than
the recovery-limiting statutes, which permit at least some recovery. Thus, if the
guest statutes withstand due process objections under the Constitution, it would
appear that a recovery-limiting statute should also be valid. 152
However, the circumstances were different, the author argued, in "that
guest statutes apply only to drivers who provide gratuitous services, a
situation which is seldom found in the provision of health care."'153
The similarity between the two types of legislation is greater, how-
ever, than that writer realized. The factual distinction is, of course, cor-
rect. The two protected classes, however, are treated similarly because
both the driver's and the physician's conduct is perceived to be altruis-
tic, notwithstanding the factual difference. This perception is far more
important than the reality. Neither the host driver nor the physician is
perceived to be acting for economic gain, and the legal rule reflects this
perception.
The fact that such legislation continues to have broad support, not-
withstanding the rather significant equal protection objections,15 4 can
be explained by the popular perception of physicians as altruists. It is
indeed a curious phenomenon that physicians are able to retain the im-
age of altruism notwithstanding the well-known fact that physicians as
a group are one of the highest paid professions.155
151. 280 U.S. 117 (1929). But cf. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr.
388 (1973) (holding the California guest statute unconstitutional).
152. Comment, supra note 149, at 1421.
153. Id. (footnote omitted).
154. See Note, supra note 149; Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation
Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 143 (1981).
155. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 93, table 145 (1987) (estimating the average gross income for physicians in
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There may be another relationship between the "malpractice cri-
sis" and the perception of physicians' altruism. Some studies have
found that "patients who sued doctors reported that the doctors had
been unresponsive [to their complaints concerning the outcome of
treatment] and had insisted on large payments despite adverse re-
sults."'156 It is at least plausible that a patient's decision to file a mal-
practice suit against the physician is linked to the disillusionment that
occurs when a patient's erroneous perception of the physician's altruism
is corrected.
III. THE ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
At least four separate, though related, theories, in addition to the
economic motivation theory, provide possible explanations of the fore-
going legal trends. These are: an implied representation and warranty
theory; a rationality and intentional conduct theory; a consent and
waiver theory; and an economic justification based on notions of inter-
nalization of costs and loss spreading.
A. Implied Representation and Warranty
Traditionally, the "implied representation" explanation for some of
the legal rules discussed has been one of the most frequently mentioned
alternatives to the economic motivation explanation. The Second Re-
statement of Torts, for example, adopted the implied representation
theory to explain the disparate treatment of licensees and business invi-
'tees.157 Professor Prosser explained that the reason for imposing on an
occupier of land a higher duty of care to a business invitee than to a
licensee is not because of the potential pecuniary benefit to the occupier
in the former case, but rather because of an implied representation by
the occupier. 15 That is, when one holds open his land to others for his
own purposes, he represents or warrants implicitly that it is safe for
certain purposes.
59
The appeal of this theory is that it also provides a plausible expla-
nation for some of the other types of cases discussed in Part II of this
1984 to be $181,300).
156. Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, 1975 DUKE L.J.
1179, 1183; see also Note, supra note 71, at 1307 (noting that one study suggests "that certain
physicians tend to encourage suits both by charging excessive fees and by falling farthest away
from the popular image of a 'model' doctor").
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332(2) (1979).
158. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 61, at 420; cf. supra note 97 and accompanying
text (discussing explanation given by the First Restatement). See generally Bohlen, The Duty of a
Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 142
(1920). Professor Bohlen was the Reporter for the First Restatement of Torts.
159. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 61, at 422.
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Article. For example, it could explain the liability of the chattel pro-
ducer or supplier in a commercial context. In addition, the modern no-
tion of strict liability in tort for defective products has its roots in
notions of implied warranty and warranty "running with the
product."' 60
This theory of implied representation, however, is simply nothing
more than another manifestation of the economic motivation theory
that this Article advances. Consider, for example, the disparate treat-
ment given to bailors for hire and gratuitous bailors.'16 Bailors for hire
are held either to a traditional negligence standard, including a duty to
inspect, or to a strict liability standard. 6 2 Gratuitous bailors generally
are not under an obligation to inspect and discover. 63 Suppose each
provides a defective product to a potential victim-why claim that the
former has warranted the safety of the product, but the latter has not?
The answer must lie in the fact that the former was economically moti-
vated but the latter was not. Once economic motivation is established,
it then seems to many people to be appropriate to impose a higher stan-
dard of care. Inasmuch as the defendant's economic motivation under-
lies both those rules, which depend on contractual notions of
consideration and tort rules pertaining to enhanced liability and dam-
ages, seeking to explain the tort rules in terms of the contract principle
fails to recognize the common denominator and shared origin of both
rules.164
Furthermore, an implied representation rationale simply fails to
explain some of the rules. For example, while it may be clear that strict
liability in tort for a "defective" product is the functional equivalent of
implied warranty once the warranty is freed from privity requirements,
it fails to explain the availability of an enhanced damages remedy when
the "warranty" has been breached for the economic benefit of the war-
rantor. Similarly, it is difficult to explain the immunity rules in terms of
any real or imagined representation made by the defendant.
160. See, e.g., Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 246, 147 N.E.2d 612,
614 (1958) (action on express warranty not defeated by lack of privity); see also Prosser, The
Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117 (1943). The "warranty" aspects
of strict liability in tort for "defective products" are also apparent in those cases in which the
courts have adopted a "consumer expectation" test for a finding of "defect."
161. See supra text accompanying notes 100-07.
162. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 104, at 715-17.
163. See id. at 717-18.
164. See Winfield, supra note 59, at 85; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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B. The Rationality Model and Intentional Conduct
Professor William Rodgers has offered two models of tort liabil-
ity.165 The first, which he refers to as "the rational decisionmaking
model," exists in situations in which "the key ingredients of rational
action" exist. These are identified as "foreknowledge of risks, identifica-
tion of options, deliberate assessment of costs and benefits, and calcu-
lated choice over a period of time.. . . [T]ypically [this model] involves
a firm, acting over time, aware of regularly recurring risks and faced
with investment decisions about reducing those risks."1 6 The second
model is the "nonrational decisionmaking model" in which the alleged
tortfeasor's conduct is "the product of reflex, habit, or snap judg-
ment.' 167 According to Professor Rodgers, the rational decisionmaker
should be subject to strict liability, while the nonrational decisionmaker
should be held only to a "subjective best efforts" standard.1 8
Quite obviously, there is a substantial overlap between this Arti-
cle's economic motivation explanation and Professor Rodgers' "rational
decisionmaking" model. The reason for the overlap is simply that most
individuals who are motivated by a desire for economic gain are also
rational actors in their attempts to realize that gain. Most of those indi-
viduals described as "typical"'6 9 will fall into both the "rational" and
the "economically motivated" categories. Conversely, there is also a
substantial overlap between those in the "nonrational decisionmaking
model" and the "self-focused, noneconomically motivated"
classification. 70
Distinguishing between the rationality or nonrationality of the ac-
tor, however, does not explain the outcome of cases in which the con-
duct is rational but altruistic. Professor Rodgers seems to assume that
altruistic conduct will always fall within the nonrational model, but this
is not necessarily true.17 For example, the rationality model does not
165. Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1 (1980).
166. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted). It is not at all clear to what extent Professor Rodgers would
insist on the "acting over time" element. It is assumed for purposes of this discussion that it is a
common feature of the cases involving the rational actor, but not an essential ingredient to the
finding of "rationality." The reason for this assumption should be reasonably obvious. If a new
company begins its business by making a conscious design choice as to the product it plans to
market, presumably it will fall into the "rationality model" even if it goes out of business shortly
thereafter. Similarly, a one-time individual actor might also know and identify risk, identify op-
tions, and indulge in a cost-benefit analysis. If this should occur, presumably his conduct would be
judged to be closer to the rationality model than to its alternative.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 7.
169. Id.
170. See supra text following note 4.
171. Professor Rodgers draws heavily upon the rescue cases in seeking to isolate the charac-
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explain the charitable immunity doctrine. While the charitable immu-
nity example is an extreme case, one also could envision a situation in
which a physician, for example, has an opportunity to behave as a
"Good Samaritan," yet have sufficient time to make rational decisions
using his superior level of training and skill. The rational decisionmak-
ing model would impose strict liability on the charitable enterprise and
the hypothetical unhurried, calculating physician. However, as noted
earlier, the case law development and legislative reaction has not fol-
lowed this pattern.'72 As descriptive devices, the rational and nonratio-
nal models are, at the very least, incomplete.
In addition to arguing that the elements of "rational decisionmak-
ing" by themselves justify, or at least explain, harsher treatment under
tort doctrine, one could also plausibly assert that when a risk creating
actor is motivated by desire for economic gain, "intentional conduct,"
or at least some state of mind that approaches "intent," must exist.173
Inasmuch as liability and damages rules tend to treat intentional mis-
conduct more harshly than inadvertent misconduct, the rules that give
rise to increased liability or increased damages are arguably related
more to the existence of intent than to the existence of a profit motive.
Like the rationality model, an intentionality rationale can explain
only a portion of those cases in which the perceived existence of a profit
motive seems to be related to certain harsher liability or damages rules.
For example, in the course of justifying the imposition of punitive dam-
ages, courts often analogize the conduct of the product manufacturer
that makes a conscious design choice to a person who commits a bat-
tery. 74 Such an analogy, to the extent that it works at all, can only be
said to work in a very limited class of cases. For example, the level of
"intentionality" of the gratuitous donor or bailor and the vendor or
teristics of the "nonrational" actor. See Rodgers, supra note 165, at 20-21. Perhaps for this reason,
he does not consider the "professional altruist."
172. See supra text accompanying note 77.
173. Problems arise when one deals with cases in which the defendant lacks subjective in-
tent, but the conduct is more than mere negligence. The first part of the problem is merely eviden-
tiary. That is, when one denies that he intended the consequences of his act, should he be
believed? Courts have dealt with this problem more or less satisfactorily through use of the famil-
iar assertion that one "is presumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences" of
his conduct. See R. DIAS & B. MARKESINIs, TORT LAW 170 (1984). But cf. PROSSER & KE-ON,
supra note 32, § 8, at 36 (asserting that a jury instruction to that effect is "plainly incorrect"). The
more difficult problem arises when the finder of fact is convinced that while anyone else would
have realized the probable or inevitable consequences, the particular defendant did not. Under
these circumstances, the courts have been forced to equate high risk misconduct with intentional
misconduct even though they clearly involve different states of mind. See, e.g., R. v. Parker, 63
Crim. App. 211, 214 (1976); see also Note, supra note 6.
174. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 820-21, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348,
388 (1981) (asserting that "[u]nlike malicious conduct directed toward a single specific individual,
Ford's tortious conduct endangered the lives of thousands of Pinto purchasers").
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bailor for hire must be judged the same. Similarly, the degree to which
a land occupier can be said to be acting intentionally is no different
regardless of whether the injured person is an invitee or a licensee. Nev-
ertheless, the doctrinal distinctions that have been made in these cases
are clear.175 Thus, it is necessary to conclude that the relevant distinc-
tion between these cases must not be whether the actor's conduct is
deemed to be intentional or unintentional or rational or irrational, but
whether or not the actor was economically motivated.
C. Consent and Waiver
While the implied warranty and representation explanation focuses
on the defendant's conduct, some courts have focused on the plaintiff's
conduct to explain the existence of some of these rules. Specifically, the
issue arises as to whether the injured plaintiff has in some sense agreed
to assume the risk."7 6 To test the validity of this theory as an alterna-
tive explanation to economic motivation, it is necessary to consider
whether the notion of consent can be used to explain the disparity be-
tween the rules of law that have developed in those cases in which the
defendant is not economically motivated and those cases in which the
defendant is economically motivated. For example, can the nonliability
of a gratuitous donor of a chattel be explained in terms of the plaintiff
accepting the risk inherent in the gift? Could the charity patient be
said to have assumed the risk of negligent treatment?
Although some courts have relied on such a theory, 7 ' it is obvi-
ously subject to criticism. 17 Not only is it unlikely that the beneficiary
of an altruistic act assumed the risk, it is also unlikely that the benefi-
ciary of the act knew of the risk. In the absence of some link between
the gratuitous or non-gratuitous nature of the risk creator's act and the
knowledge or lack of knowledge of that risk on the part of the injured
175. See supra text accompanying notes 95-111.
176. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that Professor Rodgers has
argued that assumption of risk should be a valid defense in cases in which the plaintiff's conduct
falls into the "rationality model." See Rodgers, supra note 165, at 26.
177. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) (discussed
at supra text accompanying notes 38-40 & 89-90); see also Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic
Hosp., 109 F. 294 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 183 U.S. 695 (1901); Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day
Saints Hosp., 59 Idaho 350, 82 P.2d 849 (1938); St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E.
537 (1924); Forrest v. Red Cross Hosp., 265 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1954); Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium
& Benevolent Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N.W. 1120 (1912).
178. See W. PROSSER, supra note 34, at 994 (observing that "apart from any question
whether a sick or injured man is competent to assume such a risk, the 'waiver' theory again, in
many cases, does violence to the facts. The patient goes to the hospital because he expects better
care than he would receive at home, and certainly does not in reality consent to be treated with
negligence"); see also Lindler v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S.C. 25, 32, 81 S.E. 512, 514 (1914) (Fraser, J.,
dissenting).
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individual, any attempt to explain different treatment of cases on the
basis of a consent theory must necessarily fail. It has been correctly
reasoned that "[i]f A gives a firework with a lighted fuse to B, and the
firework explodes in B's hand, B may be precluded from suing A by
reason of the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria; but A would equally
not be liable if he had sold the firework in this condition."'17 9
D. The Instrumentalist Justifications: Loss Spreading and
Internalization of Costs
At this point, it becomes necessary to analyze differently the vari-
ous manifestations of the societal suspicion of the economic gain moti-
vation. As noted in Part II of this Article, the different manifestations
include distinctions in liability rules and distinctions in damage rules.
While some of the rules that result from this social bias against eco-
nomic gain motivation are logically indefensible, some result in the in-
ternalization of costs, which spreads those costs over an appropriate
group of consumers.180 Thus, the result may be defensible, regardless of
the reason for it.
Compare, for example, the liability of the gratuitous bailor to the
liability of the bailor for hire in light of the instrumentalist goal of in-
ternalization of accidents costs. Consideration of an actor's motivation
serves to further the goal of internalization by assigning liability to the
profit seeking enterprise. In other words, the central problem facing the
enterprise liability theorist is determining which costs should be as-
signed to which enterprise. Historically, attempts to solve the problem
can be observed in the formulation of agency principles that sought to
assign the costs of an agent's activities to his principal. The "test" de-
veloped was whether the agent's act was done in the course and scope
of his principal's enterprise. 8' The course and scope of employment is-
sue was resolved traditionally by inquiring whether the agent's conduct
was for the principal's benefit. The principal's benefit frequently meant
the principal's pecuniary advantage, although pecuniary benefit never
became firmly entrenched as part of the legal doctrine. 82 Because the
cases frequently involved a principal who was engaged in a profit seek-
ing activity, furtherance of the principal's goals meant furtherance of
179. Marsh, supra note 101, at 49.
180. For the purposes of this Article, Professor Calabresi's definition of "internalization"
(i.e., placing the cost of an accident on the party who is in the best position to avoid that cost) will
be used. See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 140; Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An
Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1965).
181. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, § 70, at 501-02. See generally W. SEAVEY,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 141 (1964).
182. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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his profit seeking activity. Similarly, it is not inconsistent with an inter-
nalization goal to assign accident costs flowing from leased chattels to
the commercial lessor, even though other assignments of cost may be
preferable. On the other hand, the gratuitous bailor is probably not a
commercial lessor, and the assignment of accident costs to him will
probably not result in cost spreading over a consumer group.1 3
This is also probably true in the occupier liability cases. If a pecu-
niary benefit inures to the occupier, it is not inappropriate that he in-
ternalize and then spread the cost. The accident costs of a true social
guest on the same premises, however, are generally not part of the occu-
pier's enterprise, and thus there is a defensible reason not to require
him to internalize those costs.
Just as the legal rules that can be explained by the "rationality
model" overlap substantially the rules that can be explained by the eco-
nomic gain motivation theory,8 4 the rules that can be explained in
terms of economic gain motivation also overlap the rules that can be
explained in terms of the instrumentalist notions of loss spreading
through an enterprise liability system. Again, the reason is fairly obvi-
ous: just as those seeking economic gain generally are rational actors,
those seeking economic gain frequently are in the best position to ab-
sorb losses and spread them through the mechanism of increased prices
of the products produced by the profit seeking enterprise. The problem
with the instrumentalist justification in this context, however, is that
the liability and damages rules, which appear to be based on the exis-
tence of economic gain motivation, are not limited to those cases in
which instrumentalist goals will be realized.
There are two reasons for this. First, the legal rules that have de-
veloped tend to disfavor not only those who are acting for economic
gain, but also those who are inaccurately perceived to be acting only for
economic gain.' Even more significantly, the converse is true. Those
perceived to be acting altruistically are exempted from normal liability
and damages rules even under circumstances in which it is clear that
their conduct is economically motivated. 88
The instrumentalist rules are formulated without regard for or con-
sideration of this built-in legal bias. The inquiries are functional
ones-if liability is assigned to a given enterprise, will it be able to
183. The exception to this rule would occur when the gratuitous bailor was acting to create
goodwill, in which case his conduct is economically motivated, and thus, he should be treated as an
economically motivated actor.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 169-70.
185. See supra text accompanying note 8 and text following note 153.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 70-94 & 148-56; see also infra text accompanying
notes 191-94.
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spread the cost through increased prices? 187 Will a given enterprise be
able to insure against the risk?' Will assignment of liability exert a
general deterrent pressure? 189 The motivation of the actor plays no role
in answering any of these questions, nor is there any reason why it
should. Allowing the economic or noneconomic motivation of the actor
to influence the choice of the liability or damages rule can serve only to
distort a system based on the instrumentalist considerations.
Furthermore, it is clear that instrumentalist concerns are unable to
justify either the enhanced damages remedies or the artificial limita-
tions on damages spawned by the suspicion of those who are economi-
cally motivated. Notions of cost internalization depend on accurate
quantification of costs, as well as the appropriate assignment of costs to
cost generating activities. When there are artificially inflated damages,
as in the case of punitive damages, accurate quantification is not possi-
ble. 90 When there is an artificial limitation on damages, rational assign-
ment of cost to a given activity also is not possible, which invariably
results in the externalization of some costs.
IV. PROFIT MOTIVE AND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS SCHOOL
The "law and economics" movement makes three separate, though
related, claims regarding "economic motivation" that are relevant in
this Article. The first is the purely descriptive assertion that individuals
and business entities act to maximize their gain. This form of conduct
is described as wealth maximization, profit maximization, or, for those
economists who seek a somewhat broader application of the underlying
theory, "utility maximization."'' The second assertion, also descriptive,
is that the common-law judges have, in fact, been formulating legal doc-
trine to further the wealth maximization goal.192 The third is the nor-
mative judgment that courts should formulate legal doctrines that allow
maximization of wealth.9 3 This assertion is based on the disputed claim
187. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 64, at 1176-77.
188. Id.; see also Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault, 54 CALIF. L. RaV. 1422, 1462 (1966)
(proposing that liability be assigned to an enterprise "if the harm was of a kind which could have
been calculated-and therefore insured against-as typical for the particular enterprise").
189. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 140, at 244-65.
190. One reply to this argument posits that punitive damages are necessary because claims
are not made for all injuries, especially minor injuries. Thus, by inflating the damages in some
cases, it makes up for the costs in other cases that should be internalized but are not. See infra
text accompanying note 211.
191. But see Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103
(1979)(distinguishing utilitarianism and the wealth maximization principle).
192. R. POSNER, supra note 4.
193. Posner, supra note 191; see also Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Effi-
ciency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, in LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL IN-
TRODUCTION, WITH APPLICATIONS TO THE LAW OF TORTS (M. Kuperberg & C. Beitz eds. 1983). But
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that the public has consented implicitly to the formulation of rules that
further wealth maximizing activities.""
Quite apart from the question of which philosophical position is
better, however, is the validity of the second descriptive assertion in
view of the social bias against economically motivated conduct.195 The
shortcomings of the descriptive power of economics theory as applied to
the judicial formulation of tort doctrine is nowhere more apparent than
in the recent expansion of corporate punitive damages liability for the
marketing of "defective" products.
The economists' position on punitive damages for unintentional
conduct is entirely predictable given their basic assumptions. First, it is
argued quite appropriately that society does not seek to avoid all acci-
dents, but only "inefficient" accidents. 196 Prohibiting punitive damages
in negligence cases is "consistent with the economic criterion implicit in
the Hand formula. If the defendant's liability exceeded the expected
accident cost, he might have an incentive to incur prevention costs in
excess of the accident cost, and this would be uneconomical. 1' 97 When
confronted with a situation in which it appears that a defendant has
done precisely what the economists assert the defendant should be do-
ing, judges and jurors reject the notion that such economically efficient
behavior is socially acceptable behavior.
compare Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980) and Kronman, Wealth Max-
imization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980) with Posner, The Value of
Wealth: A Reply to Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1980).
194. See Dworkin, supra note 193; Dworkin, Why Efficiency? A Response to Professors Cala-
bresi and Posner, 1980 HOFSTRA L. REv. 563. Professor Dworkin argues that "counterfactual con-
sent," i.e., the "proposition that I would have consented had I been asked," is not consent at all
and will not justify the judicial application of a wealth maximization principle. Id. at 575.
195. The first descriptive assertion also may be questionable, particularly if one seeks to dis-
tinguish "wealth maximization" from "utility maximization" as Professor Posner has done. For
example, while an altruist is, by definition, one "who derives utility" from his conduct, it is not
clear in what sense he could be said to be acting to increase his wealth. But see Posner, supra note
191, at 123-24; Landes & Posner, supra note 77, at 95.
196. G. CALABRESI, supra note 140, at 17-18; see also Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973).
197. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 143. Significantly, punitive damages are deemed appropriate
under certain conditions. If the defendant's conduct is intentional, punitive damages serve the
function of preventing one from "substituting legal for market transactions." Id. Thus, for exam-
ple, if I decide that I want your automobile, a mechanism is necessary to prevent me from simply
taking it and allowing you to sue me for conversion. Given the fact that I can ascertain your
identity, efficiency considerations require me to negotiate a mutually agreeable price, which as-
sures that the chattel is in fact more valuable to me and, at the same time, avoiding the transac-
tion cost of enmeshing both of us in the legal system. The legal mechanism, it is argued, is punitive
damages liability.
Such a rationale, however, is clearly inapplicable to transactions in which the identity of the
potential plaintiff is not known in advance or the class of potential plaintiffs is too large to make
individual negotiation feasible.
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In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 98 for example, Ford was alleged to
have engaged in a premarketing cost-benefit analysis, balancing the
production cost of increasing the safety of the fuel tank design against
the company's anticipated liability for personal injury and property
damage if an automobile were marketed without the design changes.
Having concluded that the cost of design change would be more than
the cost of accidents, Ford marketed the Pinto without incorporating
the safety features, which the plaintiffs asserted would have prevented
their injuries. 199 The jury's response was to find Ford liable for compen-
satory damages and 125 million dollars in punitive damages.200 On ap-
peal, the punitive damages award as modified by the trial judge was
affirmed. Commenting on the defendant's cost-benefit analysis, the
court asserted:
There was evidence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous design defects at
minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by engaging in a
cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits.
Ford's institutional mentality was shown to be one of callous indifference to public
safety. There was substantial evidence that Ford's conduct constituted "conscious
disregard" of the probability of injury to members of the consuming public. 20 1
The basis of this decision is fundamentally inconsistent with the
economists' vision of the suitability of punitive damages, not simply a
variation on the justifications that economists themselves have devel-
oped. In upholding the award of punitive damages, the court implied
that the case was analogous to an intentional misconduct case.2"2 It
would follow then, that the economic justification for punitive dam-
ages-not permitting the defendant to substitute the legal system for
the market place-would be applicable.2 °3 While there may well be
valid reasons for treating certain types of conduct as the legal
equivalent of intentional conduct,204 the foregoing justification is inap-
posite under these circumstances. The simple fact is that, outside the
legal system, there is no market for the right to inflict pain or injury.205
Furthermore, because victims are not known in advance and their iden-
tities cannot be ascertained in advance, any discussion of punitive dam-
198. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
199. Id. at 790-91, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 369-70.
200. On a motion for new trial, the trial judge found the punitive damages excessive and
reduced that portion of the verdict to $3.5 million. Id. at 772, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
201. Id. at 813, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
202. Id. at 820-21, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 38; see also supra note 174 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 197.
204. See generally supra text accompanying notes 141-45.
205. One colleague has gone so far as to argue (semi-seriously) that there is a rather special-
ized market for pain in the S & M bars and bathhouses. Nevertheless, I think we can generally
agree that this represents such a highly idiosyncratic market that any values established lack ap-
plicability to the general public.
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ages as a mechanism of prohibiting the nonconsensual trafficking in the
right to injure is simply a clever metaphor and nothing more.20
The other justifications for permitting punitive damages advanced
by the economists prove too much. The first is that punitive damages
are acceptable when the damages are nonmonetizable. The second is
when the damages are concealable. s 7 The nonmonetizability claim
arises when it is more difficult than usual to assess the economic value
of the plaintiff's damages, even though the circumstances are such that
the community is prepared to concede that damage has in fact been
done. The classic example is the extent of the injury to a plaintiff's
reputation in a defamation case. 08 To the extent that "nonmone-
tizability" provides a justification for punitive damages, the justification
depends not only on the difficulty in assessing damages, but also on the
belief that attempts to quantify the damages will be on the low side,
which provides an inadequate deterrent.
While there is undoubtedly a "monetizability" problem in all per-
sonal injury litigation, the problem is certainly no greater in the cases
involving noneconomic, self-focused conduct found in the ordinary neg-
ligence case than in the economic, self-focused cases, such as the design
choice cases. From the standpoint of the law and economics school, pu-
nitive damages in products liability cases would be considered either
counter-productive, 20 1or should be allowed in all personal injury litiga-
tion. Furthermore, given the suspicion with which jurors treat those
who act with economic motivation, even in the absence of punitive
damages, there tends to be a "punitive element" present in awards of
compensatory damages in design cases.210 To the extent that the econo-
mists would require a tendency toward underestimating compensatory
damages as a condition for punitive damages, it is clear that no such
tendency exists.
The concealability argument also fails. If the occurrence of dam-
ages is concealable, for example, in theft cases in which the tortfeasor
generally is not going to be required to pay for the damages he causes,
the economists urge that punitive damages be allowed so that the actual
damages paid begin to exceed the actual damage caused in order to per-
suade the tortfeasor to choose the low transaction-cost market over the
206. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
207. See R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 143.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 49 (1982); see also Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
123 (1982).
210. Interestingly, English law expressly allows for the recovery of "aggravated damages" in
these circumstances. See generally WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 1, at 616.
[Vol. 41:63104
MOTIVATION AND TORT
high transaction-cost judicial system.2 "1 However, as in the case of
monetizability, there is no reason to believe that damages are any more
concealable in the intentional design cases than in any other type of
personal injury litigation.
In Grimshaw212 the result could perhaps have been justified by
claiming that the figures used were inappropriate. In other words, it
could be argued that Ford's cost-benefit analysis was in some sense rep-
rehensible because the values assigned to human life were set too low.
There are several problems with this argument. First, the numbers Ford
chose, while obviously open to debate, were at least not so low as to be
counter-intuitive. 3 More importantly, however, the punitive damages
award seems to reflect an abhorrence of the fact that Ford engaged in
the cost-benefit analysis at all, not that it was done improperly. The
argument is not that Ford was callous in undervaluing human life, but
that they were callous in considering its value at all. However, if the
Hand formula, or any similar cost-benefit procedure used to determine
the existence or nonexistence of negligence or product defect, is to have
any meaning at all, such a valuation is not only unavoidable, but is an
integral part of the decisionmaking process.214
The descriptive failure of economic theory is not limited to puni-
tive damages. The shortcomings of economic theory as a descriptive
tool also can be observed in the judicial formulation of rules concerning
"nonfeasance immunity." Interestingly, the leading exponents of the
law and economics movement recognize that the doctrine of nonfea-
sance immunity frequently may frustrate the efficiency objective. Un-
fortunately, they then reject the obvious explanation of the rule in a
futile attempt to deny the existence of the "second tendency" in the
formulation of tort doctrine.2 15 Professor Richard Posner, for example,
uses the example of a pedestrian who observes another pedestrian who
is about to be hit by a falling flower pot. The first can prevent injury to
the second simply by shouting a warning. Under the "nonfeasance im-
munity" rule, however, there will be no liability for his failure to shout
the warning. Under such circumstances:
The expected accident cost is high, the cost of my taking the precaution that would
avert it trivial. Nonetheless I am not liable. The result seems inconsistent with the
211. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 143.
212. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981). For a
discussion of Grimshaw, see supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
213. The cost-benefit analysis was based on the figures of $200,000 per life and $67,000 per
injury. See W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, supra note 60, at 490 (reprinting Ford's fa-
mous corporate memo).
214. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
215. The two tendencies, noted earlier, are wealth maximization, on the one hand, and suspi-
cion of the economic gain motivation, on the other. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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economic standard implicit in the Hand formula. Had transaction costs not been
prohibitive the endangered pedestrian would surely have paid me enough to over-
come my reluctance to utter a warning cry. To make me liable, therefore, would
seem to increase value. Nor would there be a difference in principle if the attempt
to warn or rescue might endanger the rescuer (and hence expected cost of precau-
tions) is less than the danger to the person in distress (and hence expected accident
cost), then the rescue will increase value-at least if the lives of the two parties are
equally valuable or the life of the victim more valuable. 210
The apparent inconsistency between common-law doctrine and the ap-
plication of wealth maximization principles is rationalized by claiming
that altruists would not respond to persons in distress if they knew that
they would be subject to liability for not responding because then they
would not get the satisfaction of being recognized as altruists.1 1 Fur-
thermore, potential rescuers, if subject to liability, might start avoiding
places such as beaches, "for fear of being legally compelled" to come to
another's rescue when it involves a risk to themselves. 18
The foregoing theory fails because it attempts to explain the legal
rule in terms of the rescuer's motivation rather than in terms of the
rulemaker's perception of the rescuer's conduct. In the course of the
explanation, therefore, dubious assumptions must be made about why
the actor acted and what sort of things people think about before they
act. It seems much more plausible to explain the rule of no liability as
an after-the-fact reward offered to the rescuer because the rulemakers
like what he has done. In short, the "nonfeasance immunity" rule
"seems" inconsistent with the "economic standard implicit in the Hand
formula" because it is inconsistent with the economic standard.219
However, the inability of the economist's model to explain the no
liability rule in the rescue cases is arguably very different from the fail-
ure of the model to explain the emergence of punitive damages in prod-
uct liability cases. In the rescue cases, in addition to the preference for
the altruist, an independent value is furthered. Personal autonomy is
chosen over efficiency, and, on this basis, the legal rule becomes defensi-
ble.220 In the case of punitive damages liability, however, one value is
216. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 131-32 (emphasis in original).
217. Id. at 132.
218. Id. at 132-33; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 77, at 120-24.
219. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 189 (1973) (arguing that
absence of liability is inefficient and irreconcilable with economic theory).
220. See Linden, supra note 53, at 242 (explaining that the rule developed because "the
judges were dubious about trying to enforce unselfishness because this was too much an infringe-
ment of person freedom"); see also Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REV. 97, 111-13 (1908).
Professor Linden also points out some of the administrative problems in requiring rescue. He
notes:
[I]t is rather difficult to select which one of the many individuals on a crowded beach should
bear the responsibility to the man who drowns in full view of them all or to the man who
starves to death in a metropolis. Moreover, there are difficulties in defining what degree of
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not being chosen over another. Rather, the emergence of punitive dam-
ages liability reflects a triumph of the social bias against the economi-
cally motivated over the establishment of a rational cost allocation
procedure.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to articulate several points. The first
was to demonstrate that a social bias exists against those whose conduct
is perceived to have been motivated by a desire to achieve economic
gain, either as an immediate or long range objective. Conversely, the
existence of this tendency can be seen as favoritism toward those whose
conduct is perceived to be motivated by a desire to confer a benefit on
another without any expectation of pecuniary reward.
The legal rules that have grown out of this tendency have been
classified as immunity rules, standard of care rules, and damages rules,
although this classification scheme is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. It
also would have been possible, for example, to have classified the rules
in terms of the source of the economic gain-whether the gain flows
from the plaintiff to the defendant or from some third party to the de-
fendant. As indicated, those legal rules, like the privity requirement,
which links the imposition of liability to the existence of an economic
exchange, serve to ensure that no burden will be imposed on the indi-
vidual who does not act for economic gain. A similar relationship can be
seen in the charitable immunity rules that excluded those who were not
beneficiaries of the altruism, as well as in the "pre-existing physician-
patient relationship" requirement of the malpractice legislation, and in
some of the other legal rules that have been mentioned.
Second, a pattern has emerged which indicates that this commu-
nity bias against those motivated by economic gain translates into judi-
cially and legislatively formulated tort doctrine. When courts abandon
or repudiate the economic gain motivation distinction in favor of a mo-
tivation neutral rule, legislatures often reintroduce the distinction,
which realigns tort doctrine with the community's sense of justice.
The illustrations used in this Article were in no sense intended to
be an exhaustive discussion of all areas of tort law in which this pattern
may be observed. Furthermore, the same social bias has found its way
into the doctrinal development of many other areas of the law. A for-
mer colleague teaching shipping law, for example, sees parallels in the
danger someone is supposed to risk in order to help someone else. Lastly, once someone offers
assistance, it is not easy to decide how long he must continue to look after the bleeding stran-
ger or the starving man.
Linden, supra note 53, at 242.
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rules controlling salvage,221 while another who teaches criminal law
points to the sanction against murder for hire.222
A recognition of the role that this bias has played and continues to
play in the formulation of legal doctrine fills in some rather significant
gaps in attempts to explain the development of the law. It would seem
to better explain the development of the law than the alternatives pro-
posed by traditional legal scholarship. The warranty and representation
explanation is itself dependent on the economic gain explanation. While
a rationality and intentionality theory clearly has much in common
with an economic gain explanation, it fails to explain many of the legal
rules that can be understood in terms of the perception of the actor's
motivation. The waiver and consent explanation is simply logically
indefensible.
While the perceived motivation of the defendant can be seen to
serve the instrumentalist goals of internalization of costs and loss
spreading, because it is frequently appropriate to assign accident costs
to the profit seeking activity, the rules do not appear to have been for-
mulated for that reason. Furthermore, inasmuch as it is the perception
of the actor's motivation, which dictates the rule, rather than his actual
motivation, it is entirely possible that some of the legal rules thus for-
mulated will fail to achieve the desired allocation of losses.
Furthermore, I submit that looking at the economic gain motive of
the actor fills in some rather significant gaps in the explanations offered
by those legal scholars who view the development of tort law in terms of
various political and economic viewpoints. Those legal scholars who see
the development of tort law as the judicial formulation of rules to pro-
tect and subsidize the industrialists are not incorrect, but their explana-
tion is incomplete. By the same token, the descriptive claim of the legal
economists regarding judicial promotion of economic efficiency is also
incomplete. While it is clear that some legal doctrine is best explained
with reference to one view or the other, the development of the law is
influenced by too many value systems and too many inconsistent and
contradictory impulses within any one value system to enable us to
hope or expect that any unified explanation will be wholly satisfactory.
Society's ambivalence toward those who act for their own pecuni-
ary benefit has resulted in what this Article has described as the two
tendencies in the development of tort law. The first tendency is protec-
tion of entrepreneurial endeavor and promotion of wealth maximizing
221. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 77.
222. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (providing that an intentional murder
"carried out for financial gain" is a "special circumstance" that will justify the imposition of the
death penalty or life imprisonment without possibility of parole).
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activity. This tendency has been recognized by legal scholars on both
the right and left, although one praises it and the other condemns it.
The second tendency is to formulate rules that treat those who are en-
gaged in such activity more harshly than those whose motivation is per-
ceived to be "noneconomic, second-party focused."
This Article has not attempted to deal with the normative aspects
of the second tendency. Some of the legal rules whose existence is best
explained by use of this tendency are defensible, while others are not.
More importantly, in some cases in which the rule is defensible, the
defense must be based on some extraneous considerations or values,
while in other cases, the second tendency is itself based on a value sys-
tem sound enough to provide a satisfactory justification for the rule's
existence. A separate consideration of these issues and problems, how-
ever, deserves an article of its own.

